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UNDERWATER AND NOT WALKING AWAY: SHAME,

FEAR, AND THE SOCIAL MANAGEMENT OF THE
HOUSING CRISIS
Brent T. White*

INTRODUCTION

Millions of homeowners in the United States are "underwater"
on their mortgages, meaning that they owe more than their homes
are worth.' Yet, despite all the concern over homeowners who are
simply "walking away" from their homes,2 the vast majority of
* Associate Professor Law, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers
College of Law. I would like to thank the following individuals for their
support, comments, and suggestions: Marc Miller, Jean Braucher, Oren BarGill, Susan Bandes, Vicki Been, Nathalie Martin, Eric Posner, Richard Thaler,
Erik Gerding, Carol Rose, Toni Massaro, Sylvia Law, Gabriel "Jack" Chin,
Barack Orbach, Ellen Bublick, Barbara Atwood, David Marcus, Melanie Fontes
Rainer, and Erick Gjerdingen.
1. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIx MONTHS 24 (2009),

available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-100909-report.pdf (reporting
that between 15-18 million homeowners are, or soon may be, underwater);
Summary of Second Quarter 2009 Negative Equity Data from First American
CoreLogic, FIRST AM. CORELOGIC (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.facorelogic.com

/uploadedFiles/Newsroom/RESin-theNews/FACL%20Negative%20Equity-fin
al_081309.pdf

[hereinafter

Second

Quarter Negative

Equity Summary]

(reporting that 15.2 million U.S. mortgages were underwater in the second
quarter of 2009).
2. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, They're Not Paying Anymore, N.Y. TIMES,

July 26, 2009, at WK6 (noting creditor concern about debtor default); 60
Minutes: The U.S. Mortgage Meltdown (CBS television broadcast May 25, 2008),

available

at

http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4126094n&tag

=related;photovideo; Cavuto: The Deal: Walk Away from Your Home (Fox

available at
2009),
19,
Feb.
broadcast
television
Business
Brian
http://video.foxbusiness.comv/3883581/walk-away-from-your-home/;
Eckhouse, Whether To Walk Away: Housing's Moral Minefield, LAS VEGAS SUN

(Mar. 22, 2009), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/mar/22/whether-walk
-away-housings-moral-minefield/; Barbara Kiviat, Walking Away From Your
Mortgage, TIME.COM

(June

19, 2008),

http://www.time.com/time/magazine

/article/0,9171,1816472,00.html; Liz Pulliam Weston, When To Walk Away from
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking
MSN,
Mortgage,
a
/HomeFinancing/WhenToWalkAwayFromAMortgage.aspx (last visited Oct. 9,
2010); John A. Schoen, Why It's a Bad Idea To Walk from the Mortgage,

MSNBCcoM (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29669640/; Eric
Weiner, Why Not Just Walk Away from A Home?, NPR (Feb. 13, 2008),
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underwater homeowners continue to make their mortgage
payments-even when they are hundreds of thousands of dollars
underwater and have no reasonable prospect of recouping their
losses.'
This includes underwater homeowners who live in
"nonrecourse states" such as California and Arizona,4 where lenders
cannot pursue defaulting homeowners for a deficiency judgment.
While such behavior may appear irrational on its face,'
behavioral economists explain that underwater homeowners simply
suffer from the same kind of cognitive biases that lead individuals to
Underwater
make other suboptimal economic decisions.7
homeowners aren't knowingly making bad choices; they just don't
cognitively grasp that they would be better off if they walked away
from their mortgages.
The behavioral economist's explanation does not account,
however, for homeowners who are fully aware that it would be in
their financial best interest to default, but still do not do so. This
Article suggests that most underwater homeowners choose not to
default as a result of two emotional forces: (1) desire to avoid the
shame or guilt associated with foreclosure; and (2) fear over the
perceived consequences of foreclosure-consequences that are in
actuality much less severe than most homeowners have been led to
believe.
Moreover, fear, shame, and guilt are not mere "transaction
costs" that homeowners calculate according to their own personal
tolerance for each. Rather, these emotional constraints are actively
cultivated by the government, the financial industry, and other
social control agents in order to induce individual homeowners to act
in ways that are against their own self-interest, but that arewrongly, this Article contends-argued to be socially beneficial.
Unlike lenders who seek to maximize profits irrespective of concerns
about morality or social responsibility, individual homeowners are
encouraged to behave in accordance with social and moral norms
that require individuals keep promises and honor financial
obligations. Thus, individual homeowners tend to ignore market
and legal norms under which strategic default might not only be a
viable option, but also the wisest financial decision. Lenders, on the
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=18958049.
3. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
6. See Yongheng Deng & John M. Quigley, Woodhead Behavior and the
Pricing of Residential Mortgages (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Program on Hous. &

Urban Policy Working Paper Series, Paper No. WOO-004, 2004), available at
http://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/DQWoodheadWeb.pdf.
7. See Peter Ubel, Human Nature and the Financial Crisis, FORBES.COM

(Feb. 22,
2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/20/behavioral-economics
-mortgage-opinions-contributorsfinancial-crisis.html.
8.

See infra Part III.
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other hand, have generally resisted calls to modify underwater
mortgages despite the fact that it would be both socially beneficial
and morally responsible for them to do so. This norm asymmetry
has led to distributional inequalities in which individual
homeowners shoulder a disproportionate financial burden from the
housing collapse.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I shows that, despite
widespread concern that underwater homeowners are simply
walking away, the vast majority of underwater homeowners have
not strategically defaulted on their mortgages. Part II explores the
financial logic of walking away from an underwater mortgage and
suggests that many more homeowners should be strategically
defaulting. Part III argues that, though cognitive biases may
account for many underwater homeowners' decisions not to
strategically default, emotions such as shame, guilt, and fear play
the largest role in homeowner decisions to knowingly eschew "inthe-money" default options. Part IV argues that social control
agents such as the government, the media, and the financial
industry use both moral suasion and disinformation to cultivate
these emotional constraints in homeowners. It also argues that
credit-rating agencies play a central role as enforcers of moral and
social norms against walking away from one's mortgage. Part V
argues that the disparity between the norms governing the behavior
of individuals and that of banks has created an imbalance in which
individual homeowners have borne a disproportionate financial
burden from the housing collapse. Part VI explores ways either to
address the distributional inequalities of norm asymmetry or to
empower homeowners to renegotiate underwater mortgages on a
more level playing field with lenders.
I. UNDERWATER AND STAYING PUT

The collapse of the U.S. housing market has left millions of
homeowners owing more on their mortgages than their homes are
worth.9 As a historical snapshot, more than 34% of all mortgaged
properties in the United States were "underwater" as of the third
quarter of 2009.'o The national numbers hide the full extent of the
9. See supranote 1 and accompanying text.
10. Media Alert, First Am. CoreLogic, First American CoreLogic Releases
Q3 Negative Equity Data (Nov. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Media Alert, 2009 Q3
Negative Equity Report], available at http://www.loanperformance.com
/infocenter/library/FACLNegativeEquityMediaAlertQ3_112409_Final.pdf.
Beginning with third-quarter figures from 2009, CoreLogic revised its
methodology for the Negative Equity Report to "account for amortization or
[home equity lines of credit] utilization." Id. Under this changed methodology,
CoreLogic reported an estimated 10.7 million residential mortgages with
negative equity-approximately 23% of all residential properties with
mortgages. Id. Using the former methodology-which takes into account a
broader landscape of homeowner debt-15.4 million residential mortgages were
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problem, however, as the percentage of underwater mortgages has
been much higher in the regions suffering the worst price declines.
Again, as a snapshot, by the end of 2009, 65% of mortgage borrowers
in Nevada were already underwater," 48% of homeowners were
underwater in Arizona, 45% were underwater in Florida, 37% were
underwater in Michigan, and 35% were underwater in California. 12
The percentage of underwater mortgages was higher still in the
hardest-hit metropolitan areas as the table below shows:

underwater, or nearly 34% of homes. Id.
This percentage is expected to increase to 48% by the first quarter of 2011.
DEUTSCHE BANK, DROWNING IN DEBT-A LOOK AT "UNDERWATER" HOMEOWNERS 5
(2009),
available
at
http://www.virtualbroker.com/pdf/2009
/mtgreportdeutschebank82009.pdf. In addition, "41% of prime conforming
borrowers and 46% of prime jumbo borrowers will be underwater," by which
time national housing prices are predicted to have dropped 42% from their
peak. Id. at 4, 14.
11. Media Alert, 2009 Q3 Negative Equity Report, supra note 10.
Outstanding Nevadan mortgage debt values were almost sixteen billion dollars,
or 14% greater than the underlying property values these loans secured. Id.
While Nevada was the only state, as of 2009, with a loan-to-value ratio over
100% (signifying negative net homeowner equity), residents of Arizona (91%),
Florida (87%), and Michigan (84%) had negative net equity with loan-to-value
ratios close to 100%. Id.
12. Id.
13. DEUTSCHE BANK, supra note 10, at 10. This chart uses data from the
end of 2009's first quarter as a historical snapshot of the mortgage crisis. Id. at
13. While the percentage of underwater homeowners may fluctuate from
quarter to quarter, the crucial point is that millions of homeowners across the

country are underwater, including the vast majority of homeowners in many
communities.
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METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA

Merced, CA
El Centro, CA
Modesto, CA
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV
Stockton, CA
Bakersfield, CA
Port St. Lucie, FL
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL
Yuba City, CA

975

CURRENT PERCENT
UNDERWATER

85%
85%
84%
81%
81%
79%
79%
78%
76%
73%

Madera, CA

72%

Fresno, CA
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL
Visalia-Porterville, CA
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ

72%
71%
70%
70%
69%
69%
68%

Not only are significant numbers of homeowners underwater,
but many are underwater by substantial amounts. By the second
quarter of 2009, for example, over 16% of homeowners had negative
equity exceeding 20% of their home's value, and over 22% of
homeowners had negative equity exceeding 10% of their home's
value. 4 Again, however, the situation was worse in the hardest-hit
markets. For example, 47% of homeowners in Nevada had negative
equity exceeding 25% of their home's value, as did 30% of
homeowners in Florida, 29% in Arizona, and 25% in California.1
Moreover, given the high median home prices at the peak within
these markets, a large percentage of these homeowners were
underwater by hundreds of thousands of dollars. 6
14. See Second QuarterNegative Equity Summary, supra note 1.
15. Id.

16. Id. For example, a homeowner who bought a home in 2006 in Salinas,
California-where home prices have dropped 70% from the peak-has on
average $214,000 in negative equity. Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi
Zingales, Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on Mortgages 2

(European Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. ECO 2009/27, 2009), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5145.pdf?newwindow=1. Moreover, given that
the average home price reached over $605,000 in Salinas at the peak of the
market, homeowners who bought even slightly better-than-average homes could
easily have negative equity exceeding $300,000. See Salinas Home Prices and
Home Values, ZILLOW.CoM, http://www.zillow.com/local-info/CA-Salinas-home
-value/r_54288/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) The story is similar, of course, in
other California metro areas, including Los Angeles, Modesto, El Centro,
Merced, Riverside, and Redding. See, e.g., Los Angeles Home Prices and Home
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This negative equity was a significant contributing factor to a
combined foreclosure and thirty-plus-day delinquency rate that
exceeded 14% for home mortgages in the third quarter of 2009, a
historic high. 7 However, the high foreclosure and delinquency rate
has not been caused by large percentages of homeowners voluntarily
walking away from their homes, even though these homeowners can
afford the payments. To the contrary, less than one-fourth of
homeowner defaults have been strategic,"' with the other threefourths triggered by job loss, divorce, or other financial difficulty,
which when combined with negative equity give homeowners no
option but to let go of their homes.' 9 In other words, for the vast
ZILLOW.com, http://www.zillow.comllocal-info/CA-Los-Angeles-homevalue/r_12447/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). The situation is also dire outside of
California. A homeowner who bought an average home near the price peak in
Las Vegas for example-where prices have dropped 58% as of October 2010would likely have negative equity in excess of $140,000. See Las Vegas Home
Values,

Prices and Home Values, ZILLOW.coM, http://www.zillow.comlocal-info/NV-Las

-Vegas-home-value/r_18959/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).

The situation is the

same in Miami, where prices are down 52%, see Miami Home Prices and Home
Values, ZILLOW.coM,
http://www.zillow.comlocal-info/FL-Miami-home-value

/r_12700/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010), and in Phoenix, where prices have dropped
56%.

See

Phoenix

Home

Prices and

Home

Values,

ZILLOW.COM,

http://www.zillow.com/local-info/AZ-Phoenix-home-value/r_40326/ (last visited
Oct. 9, 2010). Furthermore, with such significant price decreases in each of
these markets, it stands to reason a large number of individuals who bought
more-expensive-than-average homes could easily have negative equity
exceeding somewhere around $200,000 to $300,000.
17. As of the third quarter of 2009, the foreclosure rate was 4.47% and the
delinquency rate (meaning here loans that were thirty-plus days delinquent)
was 9.64%, for a combined rate of 14.36%. MORTG. BANKERS Ass'N, NATIONAL
DELINQUENCY SuRvEY: THIRD QUARTER 2009, at 2-3 (2009), available at
http://media.oregonlive.com/frontporch/other/NDSQ309.pdf. "The delinquency
rate includes loans that are at least one payment past due but does not include
loans somewhere in the process of foreclosure." Press Release, Mortg. Bankers
Ass'n, Delinquencies Continue To Climb in Latest MBA National Delinquency
Survey (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia
/PressCenter/71112.htm. Some commentators have referred to the role that
negative equity plays in causing foreclosures as "overwhelming" and
"incontrovertible." See, e.g., Christopher L. Foote et al., Reducing Foreclosures
5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston Pub. Policy Discussion Papers, Paper No. 09-2,
2009), available at http://www.bos.frb.orgeconomic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0902.pdf.
18. See EXPERIAN & OLIVER WYMAN, EXPERIAN-OLIVER WYMAN MARKET
INTELLIGENCE REPORT: UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC DEFAULT IN MORTGAGES PART

I, at 8 (2009) (finding a strategic default rate of 17% based on a review of credit
histories of homeowners in default); Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 16,
at 1 (estimating based on surveys of homeowners that nearly a quarter of
defaults are strategic).
19. See News Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Reports Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac Foreclosure Prevention Efforts for May (Aug. 3, 2009),
available
at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/14723/MayForeclosure
Prevention8309.pdf (noting that the top five reasons for delinquency are
income loss (34%), excessive obligations (20%), unemployment (8%), illness of
principal mortgagor (6%), and marital difficulties (4%)).
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majority of homeowners, negative equity is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for default.2 0 Indeed, though nearly 34% of U.S.
homeowners were underwater on their mortgages by the end of the
third quarter of 2009,21 the overall strategic default rate among all
homeowners was only 2.5% to 3.5%.22
As further evidence that relatively few homeowners
strategically default solely because they have negative equity,
housing markets with a sharply higher percentage of underwater
homeowners as compared to the national average have not
experienced sharply higher default rates. For example, although
almost 51% of Arizona homeowners were underwater (compared to
32% nationally) in the second quarter of 2009,23 the combined
foreclosure and thirty-plus-day deficiency rate in Arizona was
16.3%-only slightly above the national average of approximately
13%.24 As the chart below illustrates, this pattern of relatively low
default rates compared to the percentage of underwater mortgages
has held true almost universally across the hardest-hit markets,
with the default rate much more closely resembling the

20. Moreover, the vast majority of defaults have involved subprime or
Alternative A-Paper ("Alt-A") loans-with over 47% of subprime loans
nonperforming as of the second quarter of 2009. LAURIE GOODMAN ET AL.,
AMHERST

MORTGAGE

INSIGHT,

HOUSING

OVERHANG/SHADOW

INVENTORY

=

ENORMOUS PROBLEM 9 (2009), http://matrix.millersamuel.com/wp-content
see also MORTG.
/3q09/Amherst%2OMortgage%2OInsight%2009232009.pdf;
BANKERS Ass'N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY: SECOND QUARTER 2009, at 1-2
(2009), available at http://media.spokesman.com/documents/2009/08/Q209
NDS.pdf (finding a delinquency rate of 25.35% and a foreclosure rate of 15.05%
for subprime loans). In contrast, the default rate for prime loans was much
lower. See MORTG. BANKERS Ass'N, supra, at 1-2 (finding a delinquency rate of
6.41% and a foreclosure rate of 3% for prime loans). However, as the subprime
crisis has mostly run its course, prime fixed-rate loans now account for one in
three foreclosure starts. See Kevin G. Hall, Fixed-Rate Mortgage Foreclosures
Rising: First-QuarterNumbers Offer Troubling Forecast, SPOKESMAN-REV. (May
20, 2010), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2010/may/20/fixed-rate-mortgage
-foreclosures-rising/ (reporting the Mortgage Bankers Association's finding that
prime-fixed mortgages accounted for nearly 37% of new foreclosures started in
the first three months of 2010).
21. Media Alert, 2009 Q3 Negative Equity Report, supra note 10.
22. This range is calculated by multiplying the default rate of 14% by 17%
and 25%, which are estimates of the percentage of defaults that are strategic.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text. For a historical comparison, see
DEUTSCHE BANK, supra note 10, at 14 (noting that 7% of homeowners with
negative equity defaulted during the housing bust in Boston in the 1980s and
1990s).
23. See Second QuarterNegative Equity Summary, supra note 1.
24.

MORTG. BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 20, at 4.
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unemployment rate than the underwater percentage:
METROPOLITAN

PERCENT

SERIOUS

UNEMPLOYMENT

STATISTICAL

UNDERWATER8

DELINQUENCY

RATEc

AREA

RATEb

Merced, CA
Modesto, CA
Las VegasParadise, NV
Stockton, CA
Bakersfield, CA
Port St. Lucie,
FL
Riverside-San
BernardinoOntario, CA
OrlandoKissimmee, FL
Palm BayMelbourneTitusville, FL
LakelandWinter Haven,
FL
Phoenix-MesaScottsdale, AZ
Tampa-St.
PetersburgClearwater, FL
West Palm
Beach-Boca
Raton-Boynton
Beach, FL
Salinas, CA

85%
84%

18.99%
15.10%

17.5%
16.1%

15.53%

11.3%

81%
79%
79%

16.20%
11.92%

15.5%
13.9%

17.30%

14.1%

78%

15.19%

13.7%

71%

16.63%

10.7%

69%

10.92%

11.1%

69%

14.05%

11.9%

68%

10.09%

7.7%

65%

11.71%

11.2%

15.28%

11.2%

12.62%

11.7%

51%

The underwater percentages are derived from DEUTSCHE BANK,
DROWNING

IN DEBT-A LOOK AT "UNDERWATER"

available

at

HOMEOWNERS

10

(2009),

http://www.virtualbroker.com/pdf/2009/mtgreportdeutschebank

82009.pdf.
b

The serious delinquency rate for each locality is the combined
percentage of mortgages that more than ninety days delinquent or in
foreclosure. Paul S. Calem et al., Spatial Patterns of Mortgage Delinquency in
Major U.S. Metropolitan Areas, MARKETPULSE, June 2009, at 12, available at

http://www.corelogic.com/uploadedFiles/Pages/About Us/ResearchTrends/mp
%2009%20june%20full%20issue%20cl.pdf.
C The unemployment rates are listed in DEUTSCHE BANK,
UPDATE: THE
OUTLOOK FOR U.S.
HOME
PRICES
24-26
(2009),
available at

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/document-preview.aspx?doc-id=7719243.
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These numbers strongly suggest that factors other than
strategic defaults have been driving the delinquency rate, with
unemployment the most likely culprit." Indeed, given the striking
disparity between the percentage of underwater homeowners and
the percentage of defaults, the real mystery is not-as media
coverage has suggested-why large numbers of homeowners have
been walking away, but why, given the percentage of underwater
mortgages, more homeowners have not been.
II. THE FINANCIAL LOGIC OF WALKING AWAY

Before examining why more underwater homeowners have not
been strategically defaulting, it might be helpful to explore why they
should. A textbook premise of economics is that the value of a
home-even an owner-occupied one-is "the current value of the
rent payments that could be earned from renting the property at
market prices."27 In other words, when the net cost of buying a
home exceeds the net cost of renting, one is better off renting. The
25. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 1, at 19-21 (discussing "fifth
wave" of foreclosures caused by unemployment); DEUTSCHE BANK, UPDATE: THE
OUTLOOK FOR U.S. HOME PRICES: BEYOND THE BUBBLE 9 (2009) (discussing the
role of unemployment as the primary risk factor for default); Alan Zibel,
Foreclosures Rise 5 Percent from Summer to Fall, ABC NEWS, Oct. 15, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=8832354 ("Unemployment is the main
reason homeowners are falling into trouble. While the economy is likely out of
recession, the unemployment rate-now at a 26-year high of 9.8%--isn't
expected to peak until the middle of next year.").
Information for the Miami-Fort Lauderdale area is excluded from this chart due
to the high concentration of non-owner-occupied investment properties in the
Miami-Fort Lauderdale area, which has resulted in a deficiency rate more than
double the unemployment rate. See Kate Berry, Wary of Default, Banks Curtail
Loans
to
Investors,
Am.
BANKER
(Oct.
9,
2009),

http://www.americanbanker.com/news/wary-of default banks-curtailloansto
investors-1002848-1.html (noting that, many real estate investors "in secondhome markets" such as Miami, Las Vegas, and Phoenix, "simply turned in their
keys [to banks], defaulting on scores of second homes and investment properties
that they had intended to flip"); see also DEUTSCHE BANK, supra note 10, at 10
(listing underwater percentage for the Miami metropolitan statistical area
("MSA") of 70%, and 69% for the Fort Lauderdale MSA); DEUTSCHE BANK,
UPDATE: THE OUTLOOK FOR U.S. HOME PRICES 24-25 (2009), available at
43
(listing
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/document-preview.aspx?doc-id=77192
MSA);
Lauderdale
Fort
in
the
9.3%
and
of
8.5%,
in
Miami
rate
unemployment
Paul S. Calem et al., Spatial Patterns of Mortgage Delinquency in Major U.S.
Metropolitan Areas, MARKETPULSE, June 2009, at 12, available at

http://www.corelogic.com/uploadedFiles/Pages/AboutUs/ResearchTrends/mp
%2009%20june%20full%20issue%20cl.pdf (listing serious delinquency rate for
the Miami MSA of 22.14%, and 18.12% for the Fort Lauderdale MSA).
26. For examples of the media hype regarding the purported walk-away
phenomenon, see supra note 2.
27. HYE JIN RHO ET AL., THE CHANGING PROSPECTS FOR BUILDING HOME
EQUITY: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS OF RENTS AND THE PRICE OF HOUSING IN 100
METROPOLITAN AREAs 3 (2008), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents
/publications/ChangingProspectsior-Building-HomeEquity_2008_10.pdf.
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equation is not as simple, however, as comparing total mortgage
payments to rent payments because home ownership carries certain
benefits, including tax breaks and the potential for appreciation.2 "
Additionally, assuming a nondepreciating market, the portion of the
mortgage payment that goes to principal rather than to interest will
eventually inure to the homeowner at the time of sale. On the flip
side, homeownership carries significant costs that renting does not,
including maintenance, homeowner's insurance, and substantial
transaction costs upon selling. o
In calculating whether to buy or to rent, a potential homebuyer
should compare the net cost of owning a home to the net cost of
renting a similar home over the expected period of occupancy. The
cost of owning includes the interest-only portion of the loan
payment, property taxes, maintenance costs, homeowner's
insurance, and transaction costs upon selling, minus the expected
appreciation and cumulative tax savings over the planned period of
ownership. As a rule of thumb, a potential homebuyer is generally
better off renting when the home price exceeds fifteen or sixteen
times the annual rent for comparable homes.'
The calculation for a rational homeowner in deciding whether to
strategically default on a home mortgage is similar to that for
buying; the base calculation is still the cost of renting versus the
cost of continuing to own.32 However, the underwater homeowner
has additional considerations, including existing negative equity on
the one hand and the costs of foreclosure on the other." Even
28. See Bradford P. Anderson, Welcome to My Flipperhood: A Call To
Repair the Residential Real Estate Tax Swindle, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415,

420-22 (2009) (discussing tax benefits for residential real properties); Jeffrey T.

Lawyer, Note, Vacation Homes, Section 280A and Bolton v. Commissioner: The
Right Result for the Wrong Reasons, 1985 DUKE L.J. 793, 810 n.102 (noting that

homes have the potential for appreciation).
29. This is because in the traditional mortgage design each installment
paid by the borrower compensates the lender both for the full impact of inflation
on the outstanding loan balance and for the real interest and some of the real
principal.
See Michael S. Knoll, Taxation, Negative Amortization and
Affordable Mortgages, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341, 1346 (1992).
30. See Luke Mullins, 12 Hidden Costs of Homeownership, U.S. NEWS &

REP. (Apr. 8, 2010), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal
-finance/real-estate/articles/2010/0408/12-hidden-costs-of-homeownership.html.
31. RHO ET AL., supra note 27, at 4. Historical home prices have hewed to a
price-to-annual-rent ratio of roughly fifteen to one-except during bubbles. Id.
at 4 & n.3.
32. As a caveat, for homeowners with sufficient resources to purchase
another home before bailing on the first, the calculation might actually be the
cost of buying a new home (rather than renting) versus continuing to own their
WORLD

current home. See Nick Timiraos, Some Buy a New Home To Bail on the Old,
WALL ST. J., June 11, 2008, at A3.
33. See JOSH ROSNER, GRAHAMFISHER, HOUSING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: A
HOME WITHOUT EQUITY Is JUST A RENTAL WITH DEBT 13 (2001), available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1162456 (discussing how lack of equity changes the
default calculation).
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leaving aside foreclosure costs, the calculation as to whether one is
financially better off defaulting requires one to consider several
additional variables for which one may not have wholly reliable
information. These variables include a reasonable estimate of the
current value of one's home, the cost to rent a similar home, an idea
of how long one intends to stay in the home, and an estimate of the
average appreciation or depreciation one's home is likely to
experience over that period of time. While each variable requires
some guessing, there is a wealth of information available to assist
homeowners in making rational estimates, should they endeavor to
do so."
With these estimates in hand, homeowners also need to know
the current principal balance on their mortgage(s); the cost of the
monthly interest-only portion of their mortgage(s); the cost of
monthly mortgage insurance, if any; the amount of monthly taxes,
insurance, and homeowners' association dues, if any; and their
annual tax savings from owning versus renting.
A rational
homeowner can then make relatively simple calculations as to how
much money he would save or lose by walking away, both on a
monthly basis and over time. He can also predict how long it will
take to recover their equity.
Consider, for example, Sam and Chris, a young professional
couple with two small children, who stretched to buy their first
home-an average three-bedroom, 1380-square-foot house in
34. For example, both the Home Price Calculator and Zillow.com can
provide most homeowners with a reasonably accurate estimate of their home's
value. See HPI Calculator, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov
IDefault.aspx?Page=86
(last visited
Oct. 9,
2010);
ZILLow.com,
http://www.zillow.com (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). Or, if a home is particularly
unique, one can have the home appraised by a professional appraiser.
Similarly, one could have a real estate management company give an estimate
as to how much one's home would rent for, or simply look in the newspaper and
online to see what similar homes are renting for. Moreover, there are
considerable amounts of market-specific research available on the Internet that
can help rational individuals predict the amount of appreciation or depreciation
their home is likely to experience over a given period of time. See, e.g., Peter C.
Beller, Why Housing Hasn't Bottomed, FORBES.COM (Oct. 15, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/15/real-estate-ownership-markets-equities
-renting.html; Francesca

Levy, Where Home Prices Are Hitting Bottom,

(Sept. 18,
2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/18/home
-prices-bottoming-lifestyle-real-estate-home-prices.html.
Or a rational
individual in a nondepreciating market might simply count on appreciation at
around the historical home appreciation rate of 3-4% per year. See ClariTree
Team, U.S. Home Appreciation Rates, CLARITREE (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://claritree.com/us-home-appreciation-rates
(finding
a
historical
appreciation rate between 3% and 4%).
35. For the mathematically challenged, there are online calculators, such
as the one at YouWalkAway.com, that do these calculations automatically. See,
FORBES.COM

e.g., Does It Make FinancialSense to Walk Away & Rent?, YOUWALKAWAY.COM,

http://www.youwalkaway.com/output24/InterectiveFlashCalculator.html
visited Oct. 9, 2010).

(last
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Salinas, California-for $609,000 in January of 2006.6 Sam and
Chris had excellent credit and a solid income, and were thus able to
qualify for a thirty-year fixed-interest loan with nothing down. At
an interest rate of 6.5%, their total monthly payment is
approximately $4450," which is just under 31% of their gross
monthly income, and within the payment-to-income ratio considered
"affordable" by most lenders." However, after paying for taxes,
health insurance, student loans, childcare, automobiles, food, and
other necessities, Sam and Chris do well to break even each month.
At the time they bought their home, they were not overly concerned
about this, as they saw their mortgage payment itself as an
investment in their own and their children's futures.
Unfortunately for Sam and Chris, the housing market began to
collapse in 2007.39 Though they still owe about $578,000 on their
home,40 it is now only worth about $236,000." Sam and Chris could
rent a similar house in the neighborhood for about $1800, compared
to the $4450 they currently pay.42
Assuming they intend to stay in their home for ten years, Sam
and Chris could save approximately $310,000 by walking away,
including a monthly savings of at least $2120 by renting rather than
making mortgage payments, even after factoring in the mortgage
interest tax deduction. The financial gain for Sam and Chris from
walking away could be even more substantial if they took their
monthly savings and put it into an investment account. If they stay
in their home, on the other hand, it will take Sam and Chris over
forty years just to recover their equity-assuming, of course, that
36. This example is a hypothetical based on the peak cost of an averagepriced and average-sized home in Salinas in January 2006. See Salinas Home
Prices and Home Values, supra note 16 (listing $609,000 as the average Salinas
home price in January 2006).
37. This calculation assumes a loan of $609,000 at an annual interest rate
of 6.5%, monthly mortgage insurance of $233, monthly taxes of $250, and
monthly homeowner's insurance of $120.
38. See, e.g., How Much House Can You Afford?, CNNMONEY.COM,

http://cgi.money.cnn.com/tools/houseafford/houseafford.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2010);

Home

Affordable

Modification,

BANK

OF

AM.,

http://homeloanhelp.bankofamerica.com/en/home-affordable-modification.html
(last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
39. See Steven Gjerstad & Vernon L. Smith, Opinion, From Bubble to
Depression?,WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009, at Al5.
40. This calculation is based on amortization at fifty-four months, with
approximately $730 going toward principal each month. The remaining $3720
of the payment is interest, taxes, and insurance.
41. This price is based on Zillow data for average home values in Salinas,
California on July 1, 2010. See Salinas Home Prices and Home Values, supra

note 16 (indicating that the average home price reached $609,000 in January
2006 and that the average home was worth only $236,000 in July 2010).
42. This is based on prices of homes currently listed for sale on Zillow.com
in Salinas, California, id., and average rent identified in RHO ET AL., supra note

27, at 11.
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they live that long, that the market in Salinas has indeed hit
bottom, and, optimistically, that their home appreciates at the
historical appreciation rate of approximately 3.5%."
Millions of homeowners who bought homes in the last five years
are in situations similar to that of Sam and Chris, particularly in
the hardest-hit states of California, Florida, Nevada, and Arizona.
For example, a homeowner who bought an average home in Miami
at the peak of the housing market would have paid around
$360,000.44 That home would now be worth only about $159,000,
and, assuming a 5% down payment, the homeowner would have
approximately $170,000 in negative equity.45 Assuming he intended
to live in the house for five years, he could save approximately
$147,000 by walking away and renting a comparable home. Or, he
could stay and take twenty-five years just to recover lost equity-all
the while throwing away $1420 a month in net savings that he could
invest elsewhere. The advantage of walking away is even more
starkly evident for the large percentage of individuals who bought
more-expensive-than-average homes in the Miami area-or in any
bubble market for that matter 4 7-in the last five years. Millions of
U.S. homeowners could save hundreds of thousands of dollars by
strategically defaulting on their mortgages.
Homeowners should be walking away in droves. But they
aren't. And it's not because the financial costs of foreclosure
outweigh the benefits. To be sure, foreclosure comes with costs,
including a significant negative impact on one's credit rating.49 But
43. See ClariTree Team, supra note 34 (indicating that historical
appreciation rates for home prices have been between 3% and 4%).
44. See Miami Home Prices and Home Values, supra note 16.
45. Id. (assuming 5% down with an interest rate at the national average of
6.5% for June 2007).
46. This assumes monthly interest of $1824, mortgage insurance of $219,
taxes of $250, and homeowner's insurance of $100, with a balance of $329,830
remaining on the mortgage. This also assumes that a comparable home could
be rented for $1000. For the mortgage insurance estimate, see PMI Calculator,
GOODMORTGAGE.COM, http://www.goodmortgage.com/Calculators/PMI.html

(last

visited Oct. 9, 2010).
47. See RHO ET AL., supra note 27, at 14-17 (listing "bubble markets").
48. Average national numbers show that home prices have declined 25%
nationally from $240,000, at the peak, to $189,000 in June of 2009. See Real
Estate Market Reports, ZILLOW.COM, http://www.zillow.com/local-info/#metric

=mt%3D34%26dt%3D1%26tp%3D5%26rt%3D14%26r%3D102001 (last visited
Oct. 9, 2010).
49. Just how much impact a foreclosure has on one's credit is unclear
because the Fair Isaac Corporation will not share this information. But
generally, one can expect a 100 to 140 point hit to his or her credit as a result of
a foreclosure, and additional hits for each late payment, which are generally
reported separately from the foreclosure itself. See Dave Dinkel, How Does
Foreclosure Impact Your Credit Report, ARTICLESBASE.COM (Oct. 13, 2007),

http://www.articlesbase.com/real-estate-articles/how-does-foreclosure-impact
The total hit from late payments and a
-your-credit-report-234979.html.
foreclosure could be as much as 300 to 400 points. See Nina Silberstein, How
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assuming one had otherwise good credit and continues to meet other
credit obligations, one can have a good credit rating again-meaning
above 660-within two years after a foreclosure."o Additionally, one
can qualify for a federally insured Federal Housing Administration
("FHA") loan to purchase another home in as little as three years if
the foreclosure was caused by unemployment or other extenuating
circumstances, and in five years absent such a precipitating event.51
While the actual financial cost of having a poor credit score for a
few years may be hard to quantify, it is not likely to be significant
Foreclosure Affects

Your

Credit Score and Your Life, AOL REAL EST.,

http://realestate.aol.com/article/credit/ a/how-foreclosure-affects-your-credit
-score/2009041001 (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (recognizing credit-score drops of
up to 300 points following foreclosure); Elizabeth Weintraub, Should You
Choose

a

Shortsale

over

a

Foreclosure?,

ABOUT.COM,

http://homebuying.about.com/od/foreclosures/f/072509_Short-Sale-vs
-Foreclosure.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (reporting anecdotal evidence of 200
to 400 point credit score drops following foreclosure). Additionally, one must
wait seven years before the foreclosure disappears from one's credit report
entirely. Dinkel, supra.
50. See Mike Clover,
CREDITSCOREQUICK.COM

Mortgage Fixes
(Aug.
5,

and Your
2009,

Credit
8:55

Scores,
PM),

http://www.creditscorequick.com/blog/2009/08/05/mortgage-fixes-and-your
-credit-scores/ (noting that credit scores can improve within two years after
foreclosure if other credit accounts are kept current); Mike Clover, Revive Credit
Report After Foreclosure, CREDITSCOREQUICK.COM (Mar. 17, 2008, 12:20 AM),

http://www.creditscorequick.com/blog/2008/03/17/revive-credit-report-after
-foreclosure/ ("Your credit report might recover quickly as long as you have
other good standing credit reporting on your credit report."); Marilyn Kennedy
Melia,
Life
After
Foreclosure, BANKRATE.COM
(Sept. 4,
2009),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/mortgages/life-after-foreclosure-1.aspx ("If a
foreclosure is an isolated event on an otherwise good credit record, consumers
may be able to rehabilitate their record and garner better loans and card rates
in 24 months.").
51. See Kenneth R. Harney, The Nation's Housing: Walking Away from a
Mortgage, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2009, at E01 (suggesting, contrary to the FHA

website, that a homeowner who walks away can only obtain a new FHA loan
within three years if he or she demonstrates extenuating circumstances;
otherwise the homeowner must wait five years); 100 Questions & Answers
About Buying a New Home, U.S. DEPARTMENT HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/buying/buyhm.cfm#How (last visited Oct. 9,
2010) (outlining FHA loan qualification in questions 71-81). Because banks are
often much more willing to negotiate a short sale once it becomes clear that a
homeowner intends to default, it need not result, and often does not result, in a
foreclosure. See Sharlene Hensrud, Foreclosure Piece of Market Pie Continues
To
Shrink,
HOMEsMSP
REAL
EST.
BLOG
(Apr.
30,
2010),

http://www.homesmsprealestateblog.com/2010/04/foreclosure-piece-of-market
-pie-continues-to-shrink.html. The negative effect of a short sale on one's credit
is significantly less severe than a foreclosure and depends on the negotiated
agreement between the borrower and the lender. For example, if the lender
agrees to report the loan as "paid," there is no negative impact, whereas if the
lender reports it "settled," the negative impact can be quite significant. See
Short Sales us. Foreclosures- The Real Deal, AOL REAL EsT. (July 11, 2008),
http://realestate.aol.com/article/_a/short-sales-vs-foreclosures-the-real
/20080710013009990001.
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for most individuals-especially not when compared to the savings
achieved by walking away from a seriously underwater mortgage.
Whereas a good credit score might save an average person tens of
thousands of dollars over the course of a lifetime, a few years of poor
credit shouldn't cost more than few thousand dollars. Moreover, one
who plans to strategically default can take steps to minimize even
this marginal cost. For example, one could purchase a new vehicle,
secure a new home to rent, or even purchase a new house before
beginning the process of defaulting on one's mortgage. Most
individuals should be able to plan in advance for a few years of
limited credit.
There are, of course, costs to foreclosure other than temporarily
poor credit. These include moving costs and possible transportation
costs if one is required to live farther from work or school. But
again, these costs are minimal when compared to the savings from
shedding a home that is hundreds of thousands of dollars
underwater. The most significant financial risk from a foreclosure is
the risk of a deficiency judgment or, in the alternative, tax liability
for the unsatisfied portion of one's loan upon foreclosure. But even
these potential costs are significantly less than one might expect.
First, a number of states-including many of those with the biggest
declines in home values-are nonrecourse states, meaning states
where lenders may not pursue homeowners for a deficiency
judgment if the home was their primary residence.52 Second, even
in recourse states, lenders rarely pursue borrowers for deficiency
judgments unless they have special reason to suspect the borrower
has means to pay it.53 This is particularly true when the home is in
Third,
a state where lenders are overwhelmed with foreclosures.
tax regulations have recently changed to waive taxes on the unpaid
portion of a mortgage upon foreclosure, which was previously
classified as income to the borrower if the lender reported it as
such.
52. See Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for
the Federalizationof State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583,

631-32 (2010) (noting that in twenty-one states, including California, Arizona,
and North Carolina, most home mortgage loans are nonrecourse).
53. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1113 (2009) (finding that even in

recourse states, deficiency actions are often not cost-effective for the lender,
thus turning recourse loans into de facto nonrecourse loans).
54. See Peter S. Goodman, A Plan To Stem Foreclosures,Buried in a Paper

Avalanche, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, at Al (recognizing the lack of lender
capacity to address the number of foreclosures).
55. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 excludes income
from the discharge of debt on principal residences. Mortgage Forgiveness Debt
Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142, § 2, 121 Stat. 1803, 1803-04 (2007)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Debt reduced through
mortgage restructuring, as well as mortgage debt forgiven in connection with a
foreclosure, qualifies for relief. See The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act
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In short, the financial costs of foreclosure, while not
insignificant, are minimal compared to the financial benefit of
underwater
seriously
for
particularly
default,
strategic
homeowners.5 6 For many, default is the "in-the-money" option by
any objective measure. Yet most seriously underwater homeowners
aren't walking away, even as they sink deeper into negative equity.
III. EXPLAINING HOMEOWNER CHOICES
It might be tempting to label such underwater homeowners
"woodheads," a term sometimes applied in economic literature to
individuals who choose not to act in their own self-interest.5 7 But
labeling such behavior irrational does little to explain its existence.
One possible explanation is that the low rate of strategic default is
not the result of irrational decision making at all, but rather the
result of utility-maximizing calculations by homeowners. In other
words, it could be that underwater homeowners generally
understand that they could save hundreds of thousands of dollars by
defaulting on their mortgages, but they simply value their homes (in
which they may have "made large financial, emotional, and
The
psychological investments") more than the market does."
"market value" of a home may be, for example, $198,000, but it could
be worth $355,000 to the homeowner-indeed why else would he pay
that much for it in the first place?" Additionally, homeowners as a
class may be risk-averse, meaning that they value the security of
their good credit and the knowledge that they will not suffer a
deficiency judgment or a large tax bill (even if the risk of either is
low) more than they value the money that they could save by
and Debt Cancellation, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id
=179414,00.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). This provision applies to debt
forgiven in calendar years 2007 through 2012. Id.
56. As discussed above, a significant portion of homeowners fall into the
"seriously underwater" category. For example, 47% of homeowners in Nevada
had negative equity exceeding 25% of their home's value, as did 30% of
homeowners in Florida, 29% in Arizona, and 25% in California. Second Quarter
Negative Equity Summary, supra note 1. Given the high median home prices at
the peak within these markets, a large percentage of these homeowners are
underwater by hundreds of thousands of dollars.
57. See, e.g., Deng & Quigley, supra note 6, at abstract.
58. Lauren Ross, The Internal Costs of Foreclosure: A Qualitative Study
Exploring Issues of Trust, Insecurity, and Self in the Face of Foreclosure 9
(Aug. 31, 2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, George Washington University) (on
file with author).
59. See Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 6, 2009, (Magazine), at MM36 (discussing a general belief among
neoclassical economists "that bubbles just don't happen" and quoting Eugene
Fama, "the father of the efficient-market hypothesis," as follows: "'[Tihe word
'bubble' drives me nuts .... Housing markets are less liquid, but people are
very careful when they buy houses. It's typically the biggest investment they're
going to make, so they look around very carefully and they compare prices. The
bidding process is very detailed'").
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defaulting. Finally, homeowners as a class may value not having to
move more than they value the thousands of dollars they could save
by walking away and renting.6o As one economist has argued, "The
so-called 'underexercise' of the default option, therefore, is actually
rational behavior without transaction costs ....
This explanation naively-or deliberately-ignores much of
what the cognitive sciences tell us about how humans actually make
decisions. As behavioral economists understand, humans make
decisions in ways that are less than fully rational but are
understandable given the ways that humans (mis)perceive and
(mis)process information.62 On a basic level, most humans have
difficulty doing mathematical calculations and are easily
overwhelmed, for example, by the variety of factors that one must
consider in deciding the financial benefits and costs of strategically
defaulting. 3
Humans are also susceptible to what behavioral
economists call the status quo bias-the tendency to keep one's head
in the sand. This bias means that even those humans who could
do complex calculations if they wanted, usually don't. Moreover,
humans suffer from other cognitive biases such as myopia, or the
tendency to overvalue up-front cost and undervalue long-term
gain.65 Thus, most underwater homeowners may fail to cognitively
grasp the full benefit of strategic default.
Additionally, like all human beings, homeowners suffer from
selective perception, 66 which causes them to fail to see evidence,
60. For support of such a suggestion, see Ross, supra note 58, at 10
(discussing the ontological security of homeownership and arguing that "the
home offer[s] individuals a sense of order, continuity, and place or physical
belonging").
61. Kerry D. Vandell, Handing Over the Keys: A Perspective on Mortgage
Default Research, 21 J. Am. REAL EST. & URB. EcON. AsS'N 211, 236 (1993).

62. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 53, at 1122 (discussing the effects of
human limitations on attention, memory, and processing ability, which lead to
less-than-rational decisions, such as simply ignoring critical details in mortgage
contracts when confronted with complex calculations).
63. See, e.g., Ubel, supra note 7 (positing that human nature, when
confronted with financial decisions involving detailed mathematics, is to
disregard legitimate financial fears and follow the advice of others, such as real
estate agents).
64. See Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is
Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIz. L. REV 685,

686 (2009) (attributing human irrationality in part to status quo bias). See
generally William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in
DecisionMaking, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
65. See generally R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility

Maximization, 23 REV. EcoN. STUD. 165 (1956) (discussing myopia); Lester C.
Thurow, Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers, 64 AM, EcON. REV. 190 (1974)
(discussing cognitive biases). See Barak Y. Orbach, Unwelcome Benefits: Why
Welfare Beneficiaries Reject Government Aid, 24 LAw & INEQ. 107, 122 (2006)
(discussing myopia in welfare recipients, resulting in a preference for cash
equivalents over noncash benefits).
66. Ubel, supra note 7 (labeling the human susceptibility to selective

988

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

such as actual prices of sold homes in their neighborhood, that
would suggest a steep fall in their home's value.17 Instead, they see
contrary indicators such as the list prices of overpriced homes in
their neighborhood, which, taken out of context, suggest that prices
Selective perception also causes
have not fallen significantly.
homeowners to fail to attend to estimates on websites such as
Zillow.com or fhfa.gov that show that their home is declining in
value and to discount media reports of steep price declines as
somehow inapplicable to their unique home or to their special
neighborhood."
Relatedly, homeowners tend toward optimistic
overconfidence"-believing, for example, that home prices will
bounce back in a few years and that their homes will soon be worth
more than they paid.o Indeed, selective perception may have
caused many homebuyers to ignore signs of the impending housingmarket collapse in the first place, and optimistic overconfidence may
have caused many homeowners to take out interest-only adjustablerate mortgages ("ARMs") in the misplaced belief that they would
have better salaries in a few years or would refinance as their
home's value grew exponentially."
There is certainly much in this behavioral economic account
that helps explain the choices of underwater homeowners. Many
homeowners do tend to overvalue their homes, particularly if they
bought them during booms.72 Many homeowners also have their
perception as "unrealistic optimism").
67. See Chris Dillow, Housing Over-Confidence, INVESTORS CHRON. (Apr. 27,
2009), http://www.investorschronicle.co.uk/MarketsAndSectors/Markets/article
/20090427/52772fa2-331a-1lde-8f90-OOl44f2af8e8/Housing-overconfidence.jsp
("On hearing that a neighbour's house has sold for a low price, our reaction is
often: 'But our house is much more presentable than theirs.' Everyone thinks
they are Sarah Beeny. But they are not. . . .").

68. See id. (discussing the fact that, due to optimistic overconfidence,
sellers generally fail to adequately take price declines into account when setting
list prices).
69. See Ubel, supra note 7 (noting that due to "unrealistic optimism,"
homeowners overestimated the future growth of their salaries and home
values).
70. An analogy here would be the reluctance of many investors to sell a
share that drops significantly in value after they bought it and wait in hopes
that the share will climb back up to the initial purchase price, even though
there may be little hope of it doing so. See Whitney Tilson, Never Too Late To
Sell, MOTLEY FOOL (Mar. 20, 2001), http://www.fool.com/news/foth/2001

/foth010320.htm (discussing investor reluctance to sell underperforming stock
in the overoptimistic hope of recouping their original investment).
71. See Dillow, supra note 67 (discussing the distorting effect on prices of
the irrational belief that house prices would continue to rise).
72. See id. ("[Tihe average person over-estimates the price of their house by
between five and ten per cent. But there's variation around this average.
Whereas people who bought in recessions tend to value their houses accurately,
those who bought in booms are even more over-optimistic, overvaluing their
properties by up to 20 per cent.... There are strong cognitive biases causing
this-and not just plain wishful thinking. One is the availability heuristic
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heads in the sand, preferring to focus on things that they believe
they can control rather than things that they believe they cannot.
On the other hand, labeling the status quo bias, selective
perception, and optimistic overconfidence as "cognitive biases"
doesn't account for the way in which emotions unconsciously color
the perceptions of individuals who want, or need, to believe
something-including, for example, that their houses were worth
what they paid.74 As a large body of work in the neurosciences has
revealed, much of what passes for cognitive bias is actually
emotional bias, reached through no cognitive process whatsoever.
effect. If your biggest exposure to housing market economics came when you
bought during a boom-and of course, many more people buy in booms than
slumps-rapid house price appreciation will loom large in your mind. This will
cause you to over-estimate its size and frequency, and so over-estimate your
own house price.").
73. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. If one accepts that
homeowner decisions are the result of cognitive biases, the solution to helping
homeowners make better decisions-should policy makers or others actually
wish to encourage rational economic behavior by underwater homeowners-is
to help homeowners think better. This means providing better information,
helping homeowners calculate the benefits and costs of default, and pointing out
the cognitive biases that cloud their thinking. Under this line of thinking,
homeowners just need a little help in order to behave more rationally.
74. See Christoph Merkle, Emotion and Finance-An Interdisciplinary
Approach to the Impact of Emotions on Financial Decision Making 14-15 (Feb.
28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1097131 ("[F]eelings act as a selective attentional filter for incoming stimuli.
The strong immediate experience of emotion may lead to a crowding out of other
goals. Secondly emotion influences the retrieval of information and knowledge
from memory." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also R.B. Zajonc,
Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST

151, 157 (1980) (discussing the strength of emotional judgment).
75. See, e.g., John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable
Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462, 476 (1999) (concluding that

most human action is not the result of cognitive thought but rather of
nonconscious reaction); Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton, Introduction, in
CONSCIOUSNESS

&

EMOTION: AGENCY,

CONSCIOUS

CHOICE,

AND

SELECTIVE

PERCEPTION, at ix, x-xi (Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton eds., 2005)
(summarizing collected papers addressing the influence of emotion on
perception); Zajonc, supra note 74, at 155 (positing that most consumer
behavior is emotional); see also Milton Lodge, Charles Taber & Christopher
Weber, First Steps Toward a Dual-ProcessingAccessibility Model of Political
Beliefs, Attitudes, and Behavior, in FEELING POLITICS: EMOTION IN POLITICAL
INFORMATION PROCESSING 11, 28 (David P. Redlawsk ed., 2006) (explaining that

emotion "may indeed, be the primary vehicle implicated in motivated reasoning,
leading to selective attention, information distortions, and recall biases"); Terry
A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, "Rational Understanding," and the
Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1404 (2006) ("First, emotion

can influence both which stimuli are perceived and how they are perceived.
This is first seen through the mechanism of attention. Because emotionally
salient stimuli tend to be the ones of greatest significance to one's thriving, they
will be attended to disproportionately." (footnote omitted)); Merkle, supra note
74, at 14-15 ("Attention is focused on aspects of a situation that are consistent
with the prevailing emotion, what [sic] may result in different estimations of
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In other words, when one is consciously or unconsciously motivated
to reach a certain conclusion, the brain's emotion systems focus
awareness on information that is congruent with one's emotional
need and directs the conscious to ignore, reinterpret, or discount
As such, if a homeowner is not
incongruent information.
emotionally receptive to the idea that his home is worth thousands
less than he paid, it may be next to impossible to convince him that
he is underwater in the first place, much less that it will take
twenty years just to recover lost equity." Similarly, if a homeowner
places great emotional stock in his credit score, it may be futile to
try to convince him that a few years of poor credit is not a big deal.
Indeed, trying to persuade the homeowner that he is wrong is likely
to make him stick even more firmly to his prior beliefs.7
Thus, if one is to understand how homeowners think, one must
understand how they feel. Most mortgage default risk modeling
fundamentally fails to appreciate this point and more generally does
not account for the primacy of emotion in driving human behavior
and decision making. This may not matter if the goal is to merely
describe or model observable human behavior, but it does matter to
the extent that policy makers and others are interested in
encouraging individuals to make different choices-or to continue to
make the same choices for that matter. In most studies of
homeowner decision making, however, emotions are treated as an Xfactor to be calculated around in figuring out how other varying
factors affect individual choice and market behavior."' Emotion is
rarely considered in and of itself as a primary factor motivating both
For example, default-risk analysts have
people and markets.
studied the relationships between initial loan-to-value ratios and
mortgage default," current equity and mortgage default,"
probabilities for certain events or a different rating of an alternative's global
attractiveness.").
76. See Lodge, Taber & Weber, supra note 75, at 28-29.
77. See Ross, supra note 58, at 38 ("Many individuals are reluctant to
acknowledge that the housing and mortgage markets have significantly
changed and are no longer wholly sustainable or lucrative investments.").
78. David P. Redlawsk, Feeling Politics: New Research into Emotion and
Politics, in FEELING POLITICS: EMOTION IN POLITICAL INFORMATION PROCESSING,

supra note 75, at 1, 1-2 (explaining that individuals often end up feeling
stronger in their beliefs than they did before being confronted with information
that would have been expected, under rational models of belief formation, to
cause them to reassess their existing beliefs).
79. See Vandell, supra note 61, at 224 (observing that pricing models "all
assumed ruthless default whenever the value of the mortgage dropped beneath
the value of the property" and ignored "psychological costs"). But see Foote et
al., supra note 17, at 5 (explaining that in their default prediction model the
probability of default, guilt, shame, and reduced access to future credit were
included in the calculation).
80. See, e.g., Yongheng Deng, John M. Quigley & Robert Van Order,
Mortgage Terminations,Heterogeneity and the Exercise of Mortgage Options, 68
ECONOMETRICA 275, 280 (2000) (showing that higher default risk is related to
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affordability and mortgage default, 2 credit scores and mortgage
default," geography and mortgage default," and unemployment and
mortgage default"-to name a few. But researchers have shown
little interest in the relationship between guilt and mortgage
Nor have they shown any interest in the relationship
default.
between fear and mortgage default.
The neglect of emotion is particularly intriguing given Luigi
Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales's recent work, which
found that 81% of homeowners believe that it is immoral to default
on a mortgage and that homeowners who hold this attitude are 77%
less likely to declare their intention to default than those who do
not." Indeed, once the equity shortfall exceeds 10% of a home's
value, the study found that "moral and social considerations" are the
"most important variables in predicting the likelihood of a strategic
So strong are these variables, in fact, that only 17% of
default."8
homeowners indicated that they would default if the equity shortfall
reached 50%.9 On the other hand, the study found that people who
know someone who has strategically defaulted are 82% more likely
to declare their intention to default.o The authors thus caution that
"a policy aimed at helping people in arrears with their mortgage
could have devastating effects on the incentives to strategically
default of people who can afford to pay their mortgage if it is
perceived to bail out people unjustly and thus undermine the moral

higher initial loan-to-value loans).
81. See generally, e.g., Neil Bhutta, Jane Dokko & Hui Shan, Depth of
Negative Equity and Mortgage Default Decisions (Div. of Research & Statistics
& Monetary Affairs Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Paper No.
2010-35, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010
/201035/201035pap.pdf.
82. See, e.g., Foote et al., supra note 17, at 3-13.
83. See generally Satyajit Chatterjee, Dean Corbae & Jos6-Victor Rios-Rull,
A Theory of Credit Scoring and Competitive Pricing of Default Risk (Sept. 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://pier.econ.upenn.edu/Events
/scorevictor.pdf.
84. See, e.g., Deng, Quigley & Van Order, supra note 80, at 294-303.
85. See, e.g., id. at 290 (finding that trigger events, such as unemployment
and divorce, have a significant impact on homeowners' exercise of the default
option).
86. While it may seem obvious that one who feels guilty about the idea of
defaulting will be less likely to do so, it is equally obvious that those with high
loan-to-value ratios, the unemployed, and individuals with low credit scores will
be more likely to default. But economists study these things anyway in order to
determine how much they matter and how predictive they are of mortgage
default. Such information is used by economists to assist lenders in assessing
risk and pricing mortgages, but it also informs public policy by purporting to
illuminate the most efficient ways to reduce foreclosures.
87. Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 16, at 19, 21.
88. Id. at 18-19.
89. Id. at 21.
90. Id. at 21-22.
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commitment to pay."
While the study sheds important light on the role of social and
moral constraints in the default decision, its conclusion also
highlights the problem with crafting public policy on the basis of
studies that do not try to understand why people act the way that
they do. Perhaps the authors are right; perhaps people will respond
to loan modification programs for those who can no longer afford
their mortgages by defaulting on their own mortgages, but there is
no evidence to suggest that this is the case. One might just as easily
assert that the failure of banks to modify loans for individuals in
need, while banks themselves have been bailed out by the federal
government, will cause individuals to conclude that they should
forget about morals and just look out for their own self-interests.9 2
In order to know whether either of these assertions is true, one
needs to understand how moral beliefs and attitudes are formed,
and one needs to understand how humans make decisions. As
evidence from the cognitive sciences convincingly demonstrates,
emotion is primary to both.93
The Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales study does, however, confirm
something that policy makers and lenders already know and use to
their advantage: people are less likely to default if doing so will
make them feel like immoral or irresponsible persons, and are
especially unlikely to default if they believe others will think of
them as immoral or irresponsible persons." Guilt and shame are
powerful motivators,95 and there is no doubt that many people who
91. Id. at 3. Indeed, one thrust of the paper is that President Barack
Obama's administration's plan to encourage modification of loans to make them
more affordable is misguided and likely to backfire. Id. at 21.
92. For an example of one individual who feels this way, see LSerbanescu,
Comment to Mortgage Defaults in America: Can Pay, Won't Pay: It Is Easierto
Dump a Home Loan If a FriendHas Done So Too, ECONOMIsT (June 27, 2009,

10:02 PM), http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displayStory.cfm?story
id=13905502&mode=comment&#commentStartPosition ("The financial system
created the house market bubble, putting everyone that wanted a house in the
uncomfortable position of paying inflated prices. The financial establishment
made tons of money in the process.... Now that ditching a mortgage makes
economic sense for a homeowner, The Economist discovers that such behavior is
immoral.... [Wlhy should anyone be morally obliged to continue to pay
[inflated home prices] at a loss?").
93. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
94. Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 16, at 3 ("Moral norms, if
widespread, may strongly mitigate the likelihood that American households will
default on their mortgage .. . ."). Research in social psychology has shown that
humans invest significant emotional stake in "face"-or their claimed identity
as a competent, intelligent, or moral person-and will go to great lengths to
avoid actions that publicly threaten this identity. See, e.g., Holley S. Hodgins &
Elizabeth Liebeskind, Apology Versus Defense: Antecedents and Consequences,

39 J. ExPEiUMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 297, 297 (2003).
95. See Danielle Einstein & Kevin Lanning,

Shame, Guilt, Ego

Development, and the Five-FactorModel of Personality,66 J. PERSONALITY 555,

556 (1998) (explaining that guilt and shame are negative affective states that
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have faced foreclosure feel a great deal of both.9 6
As Linda, a single mom in Tampa, explained, "As a mom, I feel
It's a terrible embarrassment, and
like I let my children down ....
97
is
not alone: a recent qualitative
Linda
humiliating."
it's
costs of foreclosure found that
internal
of
the
sociological study
and embarrassment dominated
shame,
failure,
of
personal
feelings
their homes to foreclosure."
lost
had
who
individuals
the accounts of
when individuals were
even
predominated
feelings
Moreover, such
of the declining
victims
but
were
predicament,
their
for
not at fault
And, as
brokers."
mortgage
by
practices
economy or unethical
experience
who
those
by
felt
guilt
and
shame
of
the
evidence
further
foreclosure, large damage awards for humiliation are common
features of successful suits against lenders for wrongful
foreclosure. 10
act as moral voices guiding social activity of individuals).
96. See Ross, supra note 58, at 37 ("The notion of guilt ascription was also
central to these findings. Although many individuals recounted the exact ways
in which they were 'misled' in their loan negotiations, they often returned to the
idea of being personally responsible for their actions.").
97. Judi Hasson, Homeowners Who Just Walk Away, MSN MONEY (Apr. 9,
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/HomeFinancing
2008),
/HomeownersWhoJustWalkAway.aspx.
98. Ross, supra note 58, at 37-38.
99. See id. at 35-38. One woman in the study described her sense of
"utmost responsibility to make her monthly payments on time" saying, "I made
a commitment to pay my loan and I want to pay my loan. I'm a hard working
person and I want to make good on my loan, but there's no way I possibly can in
the situation the economy's in right now." Id. at 35. Others expressed concern
over being perceived as "irresponsible citizens" or "burdens on society":
And um so I'm just, I'm kind of interested in the public perception.
You know I don't want to be a burden on the rest of society because
I'm not paying my mortgage. Now there's this big giant bailout and
I'm involved in that. You know, my mortgage was one of the
mortgages not being paid.

Id.

100. See, e.g., Carter v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 3:07CV651, 2009 WL
1010851, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 14, 2009) (allowing claims for humiliation and
damage to reputation due to wrongful foreclosure under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") and the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act ("FDCPA")); Brannon v. Bridge Capital Corp., No. 1:06cv996-MHT, 2008
WL 2225791, at *2 (M.D. Ala. May 27, 2008) (discussing plaintiffs claim that
"foreclosure publishings caused him embarrassment and humiliation"); Lee v.
Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP, No. 1:06-cv-585, 2008 WL 1886178, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 25, 2008) (noting that claim for humiliation from wrongful foreclosure
is recoverable under the FDCPA), rev'd on other grounds, 601 F.3d 654 (6th Cir.
2010); Clark v. West, 395 S.E.2d 884, 885 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
mortgagor's obtaining cancellation of foreclosure sale in equitable action did not
bar her from pursuing separate claim of damages for humiliation and emotional
distress for the alleged intentional, wrongful foreclosure by mortgagees); Levine
v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 917 So. 2d 1235, 1243-45 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding evidence was sufficient to support award to mortgagor of $150,000 for
humiliation and embarrassment and $150,000 for mental anguish); Cushing &
Dolan, PC v. Nat'l Lenders, Inc., No. 0105215, 2004 WL 2712208, at *2 n.4
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While no study to date has sought to quantify the role of the
desire to avoid guilt and shame in underwater homeowners'
decisions not to strategically default, more general studies on the
role of guilt and shame in motivating human behavior suggest that
there is a significant impact.1ox The desire to avoid guilt and shame
cannot, however, completely explain the reluctance of homeowners
to default. Indeed, the Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales study found
that only 41% of individuals with no moral issue with strategic
default would strategically default at $100,000 in negative equity. 0 2
The question is thus: What keeps the other 59% from walking?
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales theorize that even "amoral" people
may be deterred from defaulting by the social stigma that comes
with foreclosure.103 They are probably right-up to a point. But
their study did not actually ask these "amoral" individuals what
keeps them from walking away. At some point-if not $100,000
then $200,000 (where 41% of the "amoral" individuals still would not
walk) 1 4-social stigma alone becomes an unconvincing explanation.
Moreover, foreclosure rates are considerably lower than would
be suggested by the Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales study, as the
percentage of people who actually default is much lower than the
percentage that indicated they would default in the survey, moral
For example, the study found that 26% of
qualms or not.
individuals would default at $100,000 in negative equity and 41%
(Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2004) (recognizing claim for "humiliation" due to
"public notices of foreclosure on their home and the inspection of their home by
potential buyers, lawyers, and auctioneers"); Volk v. Wis. Mortg. Assurance Co.,
474 N.W.2d 40, 44 (N.D. 1991) (recognizing plaintiffs claim for damage to
"personal reputation, credit rating, [and] financial reputation, [and injuries as a
result of] unfavorable publicity, embarrassment, humiliation, and ridicule
caused by the foreclosure action"); Union Fed. Say. Bank v. Hale, Nos. 16209,
16211, 1993 WL 488399, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1993) (reciting
defendant's allegations that "as a result of Plaintiffs wrongful refusal to accept
the aforementioned mortgage payments, I have suffered damage to my credit
rating and reputation; emotional distress, anxiety, embarrassment, humiliation
and worry"); Mason v. Chase Bank, N.A., No. 05-07-01513-CV, 2008 WL
3412212, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2008) (noting plaintiffs claim for
damages for humiliation from attempted foreclosure).
101. See, e.g., CARROLL E. IZARD, HUMAN EMoTIONS 421-52 (1977)
(explaining that guilt is the primary motivational factor in a mature
conscience); Damien Arthur & Pascale Quester, Who's Afraid of That Ad?

Applying Segmentation to the Protection Motivation Model, 21 PSYCHOL. &
MARKETING 671 (2004) (demonstrating the importance of fear in determining

behavior); Dwight Merunka et al., Modeling and Measuring the Impact of Fear,

Guilt and Shame Appeals on Persuasionfor Health Communication:A Study of
Anti-Alcohol Messages Directed at Young Adults (Euromed Marseille Ecole de
available at
2009),
04-2007,
No.
Paper
Working
Management,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=963593 ("Shame motivates social behavior and leads to
conformity to social norm.").
102. Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 16, at 10.
103. Id. at 8-9.
104. Id. at 10.
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would do so at $200,000.105 But given the number of homeowners
who are significantly underwater, one would that expect foreclosure
rates should be higher if this were the case.
The voices of those who have actually faced foreclosure suggest
another powerful emotion that may be keeping homeowners from
defaulting: fear. Indeed, the term commonly used to describe
As one
foreclosure by those who face it is "terrifying." 0 6
commentator on foreclosure has noted, "Foreclosure is that
terrifying word no homeowner ever wants to hear, let alone
experience."1o7 People not only fear losing their homes, but also fear
having ruined credit for life and not being able to find a decent place
to live, to buy a car, to get a credit card, to get insurance, to ever buy
a house, or even to get a job. Foreclosure is seen as the end of life as
one knows it-financial suicide to be avoided at all costs.'08 In short,
fear, like shame and guilt, is a powerful motivator in homeowner
decisions not to default.'0 9
Further empirical study is necessary to comprehend the
statistical significance of shame, guilt, and fear in homeowner
decisions to strategically default. But all three play a critical role in
motivating human behavior and deserve further academic study in
0 Academics and nonacademics alike,
the mortgage default context.o"
however, intuitively understand the power of these emotions to
105. Id. at 17.
106. See John Leland, Facing Default, Some Abandon Homes to Banks, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at Al (reporting homeowner terror of foreclosure); Las
Vegas Military Wife Fights To Save Home, 8NEWSNOW.COM (Aug. 20, 2009),
http://www.lasvegasnow.com/Global/story.asp?S=10965954
(describing
"terrifying fight" to save home).
107. Jenny Greenleaf, About ForeclosureLaw, EHow, http://www.ehow.com
/about 4571547 foreclosure-law.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
108. Of course, to argue that homeowner decisions not to default are
motivated by fear is not to suggest that cognitive biases play no role. The two
Much
are not mutually exclusive but rather are mutually reinforcing.
homeowner fear is driven by the misperception or overestimation of the future
costs associated with foreclosure, and this fear in turn leads to further selective
perception and wishful thinking about the probability of housing prices
returning to previous levels.
109. See, e.g., Arthur & Quester, supra note 101, at 693 (confirming the
positive relationship between fear and persuasion); Irving L. Janis & Seymour
Feshbach, Effects of Fear-Arousing Communications, 48 J. ABNORMAL & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 78, 78 (1953) (finding that appeals to fear influence attitudes and
behavior); Michael S. LaTour & Herbert J. Rotfeld, There Are Threats and
(Maybe) Fear-CausedArousal: Theory and Confusions of Appeals to Fear and
Fear Arousal Itself, 26 J. ADVERTISING 45, 47-50 (1997) (observing that fear
motivates behavior).
110. For studies of the role of guilt, shame, and fear in motivating behavior
in other contexts, see generally, for example, Arthur & Quester, supra note 101
(demonstrating the power of negative emotions of fear, guilt, and shame in
marketing); Ken Chapman, FearAppeal Research: Perspective and Application,
3 Am. MARKETING Ass'N SUMMER EDUCATOR'S CONF. PRoc. 1 (1992) (finding that
negative emotional responses significantly influence individual behavior).
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control human behavior.
As such, those who benefit from
underwater homeowners' decisions not to default have not waited
for statistical proof of the efficacy of those emotions to cultivate
them."
IV. THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE HOUSING CRISIS
A concern repeatedly voiced by policy makers, economists, and
the media is that the "social pressure not to default" will weaken to
the point that homeowners will begin to walk in droves." 2 Of
particular concern is the contagion effect-the notion that once a
few people in a neighborhood walk, others will follow, until whole
neighborhoods end up as empty wastelands." 3 Indeed, geographical
patterns already show that foreclosures cluster in neighborhoods, 1 14
suggesting that once foreclosure is seen as acceptable within a given
community, and an individual knows others who have survived
foreclosure, there may be less reason to feel ashamed of one's
decision to walk or to fear the consequences.
Alarmed by the possibility that foreclosures may reach a tipping
point, formal federal policy has aimed to stem the tide of
foreclosures through programs designed to "reduce household cash
flow problems," such as the Making Home Affordable ("MHA") loan
modification program" and Hope for Homeowners."' Implicit in
this approach is the assumption that homeowners are unlikely to
default on their mortgages if they can "afford" the monthly

111. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Human Worth as Collateral, 38 RUTGERS L.J.
793, 820 (2007) ("Credit card lenders ... do seem to recognize the power of
shaming their borrowers, though they may not explicitly describe it as such.").
112. See Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 16, at 2, 22 (reporting that
"strategic defaults may produce contagion effects" and that policy makers
should worry that these contagion effects will weaken social pressure not to
default and result in a higher rate of strategic default).
113. See id.; John P. Harding, Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent W. Yao, The
Contagion Effect of Foreclosed Properties, 66 J. URB. EcON. 164, 174 (2009)

(noting that "nearby distressed property has a significant, negative effect on the
prices of nearby homes over and above the overall trend in market prices").
114. See Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 16, at 6.
115.

See About Making Home Affordable, MAKINGHOMEAFFORDABLE.GOV,

http://makinghomeaffordable.gov/about.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2010)
(explaining that the Making Home Affordable program "provides eligible
homeowners the opportunity to modify their mortgages to make them more
affordable").
116. The FHA website describes the Hope for Homeowners program as
follows: "Under the program, certain borrowers facing difficulty with their
mortgage will be eligible to refinance into FHA-insured mortgages they can
afford.. . . [L]enders will be encouraged to write-down the outstanding
mortgage principal balances to 90 percent of the new value of the property."
Fact Sheet: FHA To Provide Additional Mortgage Assistance to Struggling
Homeowners, U.S. DEPARTMENT HOUSING & URB. DEV., http://www.hud.gov

/fha/home080730.cfm (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
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In other words, federal policy assumes that
payments.17
homeowners are-for the most part-not "ruthless" and won't walk
away from their mortgages simply because they have negative
equity."' Most homeowners walk only when they can no longer
afford to stay. As evidence of this fact, only 45% of homeowners said
they would walk even if they had $300,000 in negative equity."9
This percentage drops to 38% among the subset of individuals who
believe it is immoral to strategically default on one's mortgage (a
subset to which 87% of homeowners belong).120
These numbers suggest that the "moral constraint" is a
powerful one indeed, and that, for most people, only the complete
inability to afford their mortgage would push them to default. On
the other hand, the fact that 63% of "amoral" individuals would
default at $300,000 in negative equity, and 59% would do so at
$200,000,121 suggests that federal policy can only proceed on the
premise that affordability is the prime consideration as long as the
moral and social constraints on foreclosure remain strong. The
government, along with certain other economic and social
institutions interested in limiting the number of foreclosures, thus
has an incentive to cultivate guilt and shame in those who would
contemplate walking away. Similarly, knowing that guilt and
shame alone are not enough to prevent many individuals from
defaulting once negative equity is extreme, these same institutions
have an interest in increasing the perceived cost of foreclosure by
cultivating fear of financial disaster for those who contemplate it.
This is not to say that there is a grand scheme to manipulate
the emotions of homeowners, or even that the government and other
institutions consciously cultivate these emotional constraints on
default.122 But, to be sure, the predominant message of political,
social, and economic institutions in the United States has functioned
to cultivate fear, shame, and guilt in those who might contemplate
foreclosure.
These emotions in turn function as a form of
internalized social control, encouraging conformity to the norm of
117. See Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 16, at 19 (finding that 81%
of respondents think that it is morally wrong for a homeowner to default on a
mortgage when he or she can afford to make payments).
118. See Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Risk, Credit Scoring, and the
Performance of Home Mortgages, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 621, 623 (1996) (noting

that credit-risk models reflect the fact that few borrowers are ruthless).
119. Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 16, at 27.
120. Id. at 10.
121. Id.
122. Social control is defined by most contemporary scholars "as attempts,

whether intentional or not, by the state or social institutions to regulate or
encourage conformity to a set or norms through socialization or through the
threat of coercion, or both." K. Viswanath & David Demers, Introduction: Mass
Media from a Macrosocial Perspective, in MASS MEDIA, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND
SOCIAL CHANGE: A MACROSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 9 (David Demers
Viswanath eds., 1998).
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meeting one's mortgage obligations as long as one can afford to do
123
SO.
The clear message to American homeowners from nearly all
fronts is that one has a moral responsibility to pay one's mortgage.
The message is conveyed not only by political, social, and economic
institutions, but by the majority of Americans who believe that
voluntarily defaulting on a mortgage is immoral. At the political
level, government spokespersons, including President Obama, have
repeatedly emphasized the virtue of homeowners who have acted
"responsibl[y]" in "mak[ing] their mortgage payments each month" 124
and have lamented the erosion of "our common values" by, for
example, those who irresponsibly borrowed beyond their means.
The worst criticism has been reserved, however, for those who would
walk away from mortgages that they can afford. Typical of such
criticism is that of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, who
declared in a televised speech: "And let me emphasize, any
homeowner who can afford his mortgage payment but chooses to
walk away from an underwater property is simply a speculatorand one who is not honoring his obligations." 26
Paulson's comment is mild, however, compared to the media
invective toward those who strategically walk from their mort ages.
Such individuals are portrayed as unseemly, 27 offensive, 2 and
unethical,129 and likened to deadbeat dads who walk out on their
children2 o or to those who would have "given up" and just handed
Europe over to the Nazis.'1'
123. See id. (noting scholarly work that suggests that social control is most
effective when "external control comes to be incorporated into the personality of
the individual").
124. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Housing
Mortgage Crisis at Dobson High School (Feb. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-the
-mortgage-crisis/.
125. Id.
126. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't Treasury, U.S. Housing and
Mortgage Market Update Before the National Association of Business
Economists (Mar. 3, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases
/hp856.htm.
127. Cavuto: The Deal: Walk Away From Your Home, supra note 2 ("Seems
something unseemly about that.... Everyone else in the country is trying to
pay their mortgages and trying to get things done. They realize in many cases
they are underwater. Their mortgage might be worth more than their
If you have obnoxious kids, walk away from your kids.... Seems
home ....
kind of weird. Don't you think?").
128. Id. ("I know you are not looking at the ethics of this; you are a good
savvy businessman. But do you find it even a tinge offensive that we are
moving away from personal responsibility? If we can't hack it, we bail out of
it.").
129. The Mike GallagherShow: Youwalkaway.com (May 1, 2009) (transcript
on file with author).
130. Cavuto: The Deal: Walk Away From Your Home, supra note 2.
131. Id. ("And you know when you enter into an agreement and everyone
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There is similarly no shortage of moralizing about the
responsibilities of mortgagors. Typical media messages include: "we
need a culture of responsible consumers and homeowners";132 "one
should always honor financial obligations";" "when you enter into a
contract ... that should mean something";134 "there was a
time ... when people felt really bad about not paying off a debt";' 3 1
and, "money is more than a matter of numbers. There are ethics
involved. Most people feel, or should feel, an obligation to pay their
debts." 36 Even sympathy for those who default because of predatory
lending is frequently lacking: "We've read too many sob stories in
the press about 'predatory lending'-a rare, misunderstood, and
vastly exaggerated phenomenon. It's time for the poster children for
irresponsibility to get some face time.", 7
Indeed, a homeowner contemplating a strategic default would
be hard-pressed to avoid the message that doing so would place him
among the most despicable members of society. It is thus not
surprising that a large number of media stories about individuals
who walk on their mortgages indicate that these individuals ask
that their "last name not be used" to protect their privacy. 38
Nobody wants to be indentified as a deadbeat-or, as one
commentator describes them, "a blight on our society."" 9 Such
individuals seek to protect their privacy for good reason, as it is not
just the media and the government that act as norm enforcers, but
also individuals, as can be seen in the frequent railings on Internet
comment boards and blogs about strategic defaulters. In one typical
example, "Bob Green," an individual enraged by the story of "Raam,"
who posted his own story of why he strategically defaulted on his
mortgage, wrote:
Amazing. Simply amazing. The types of speculators like
"Raam" and others should be tied to a tree and left to rot. It's
these fine people who are going to walk away and leave the
just throws up the keys and says you know it's really tough this month, it's
gonna be tough next month ... declining real estate values, and we are just
going to quit. Can you imagine if we all did that ... going into World War
II? ... The Japanese just kicked our butt at Pearl Harbor, it just looks so
overwhelming, and the odds are so daunting and Germany has just taken over
all Europe. Man oh man, let's just cease and desist.").
132. Weiner, supranote 2.
133. Id.
134.
135.

Cavuto: The Deal: Walk Away From Your Home, supra note 2.
60 Minutes: The U.S. Mortgage Meltdown, supra note 2.

136. Pulliam Weston, supra note 2.
137. Steven Spruiell, Obama Pays Bail Money, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (June 12,
2008),

http://article.nationalreview.com/q=OWJkNGE3ZjIyYTAzOTg0MWJIY

mViM2FlZGVjMjY4ZmY=.
138. See, e.g., Jennifer Robison & Hubble Smith, Buying & Bailing: Walking
Away from 'Underwater' Mortgage Has Pitfalls, LAS VEGAS REv.-J. (Aug. 30,

2009), http://www.lvirj.com/news/56171687.html.
139. Eckhouse, supra note 2.
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societal [sic], writ large, on the hook for their problems. Good
job Raam-way to take responsibility.140
Moreover, a homeowner who turned to any number of creditcounseling agencies would also find little sympathy-and much
moralizing-should he announce his plan to walk on his "affordable"
mortgage. Gail Cunningham of the National Foundation for Credit
Counseling declared, for example, in an interview on NPR: "Walking
away from one's home should be the absolute last resort....
However desperate a situation might become for a homeowner, that
does not relieve us of our responsibilities." 4 ' Indeed, the uniform
message of both government and nonprofit counseling agencies
(which are typically funded at least in significant part by the
financial industry) is that "walking away" is not a responsible
choice1 4 2 and should be avoided at all costs.143
140. Bob Green, Comment to Should You Walk Away From Your Home?,

(Jan. 3, 2009), http://www.mint.com/blog/finance-core/should-you
-walk-away-from-your-home/. "Raam" tells his story as follows:
I purchased my first rental property at the age of 21. Everyone said I
would make a killing and was really smart for investing so young. I
wish I had done more research and seen that we were approaching an
inevitable bubble. I bought my first property (a 2-family) for $190k in
2003. Within a year it was valued at double that. After refinancing
and putting money into the first property, I bought two more
properties the following two years. I had 12 tenants total (being a
landlord is no easy task!). The mortgage lenders were pushing ARM's
like crazy ... and they made sense to an investor like me. I needed
the lowest monthly payment so I could take the little income left from
the rent to put back into the properties. Plus, I could always just
refinance my 2-year fixed/28 year adjustable mortgage before the 2
years-fixed were up (refinance to a conventional 30-year
fixed) ... right? Well, taxes went way up. I had a few tenants that
cost me over $15k in lost rent (damn tenant-rights laws!), unexpected
property damage from frozen water pipes, a couple more bad tenants,
and while all this was happening the value of my house secretly
dropped below the amount I owed ... oh sh*t. Then I get a letter in
the mail saying my monthly mortgage payments are going to increase
by more than $600 a month. . . but wait, I'm already dishing out over
$200 a month from my pocket to pay for the properties (assuming all
the units are fully rented)! I can't refinance because the value of the
property is less than what I owe. I can bust my ass for the next 5-10
years trying to keep up with the payments or I can let everything fall
down, file for bankruptcy, and move on. I'm filing. And I'm damn
glad. $450k multi-family properties are now for sale at $140k ... less
than I bought my first property in 2003. For me it's easy because they
were investment properties, not houses my family lived in (I'm single).
I'm renting now and saving as much money as I can, because when
things start to turn around I want to be ready, not buried under a
million dollars in debt.
MINTLIFE

Raam, Comment to Should You Walk Away From Your Home?, supra.

141. Weiner, supra note 2.
142. See,
e.g.,
Foreclosure
Prevention
FAQs,
http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home&c=homeowners
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What makes this moral suasion so effective is that major
socializing agents in the United States tend to speak with one voice.
Thus, when the government, or the credit industry, tells individuals
that they have a responsibility to pay their mortgage even if they
are seriously underwater, the message is seen as "echoing a deepseated American belief that one should always honor financial
obligations,"'"-and not as an effort to saddle the primary burden of
the housing meltdown on homeowners rather than on the financial
industry or the government. More critically, because the media and
nonprofit consumer-counseling agencies promote the same message,
the government and the financial industry need not bear the
primary burden of moral suasion-nor is the message ever identified
with those political and economic institutions that have a vested
interest in promoting "homeowner responsibility." The message
rings true to the ear and, as such, most homeowners question
neither the content of the message nor its source. 145
Social control of would-be defaulters is not limited to moral
suasion, however. Predominant messages regarding foreclosure also
frequently employ fear to persuade homeowners that strategic
default is a bad choice:
What is real-and what is very much downplayed by these
outfits [like YouWalkAway.com]-is how completely a
foreclosure wrecks your finances. Near term, you might get
slammed with a massive tax bill, since forgiven debt can be
subject to income tax. Long term, car loans and-you guessed
it-home loans will be much harder to come by. How's that for
walking away? "This is the American Dream ended in
foreclosurepreventionfaqs (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). Fannie Mae answers the
question, "Is it best to walk away from my property if I can no longer make the
payments?" as follows: "Walking away from your property is not a good choice.
Continue to live in your house as long as you are trying to get help from your
mortgage company or through a housing counselor." Id.
143.

U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., How To AVOID FORECLOSURE (2001),

available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/forms/files/pa426h.pdf
(stressing to homeowners that "you should avoid foreclosure if possible" and not
"lose your home and damage your credit history"); see also Default/Foreclosure,
ANAHEIM

HOusING

COUNSELING

AGENCY,

http://www.anaheimhousingcounselingagency.org/id21.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2010) ("Losing your home can be the worst and most devastating event to you
personally, and your credit history. This is a scenario that you don't want to
occur if you can avoid it!"); ForeclosureAvoidance Counseling, U.S. DEPARTMENT

HOUSING & URB. DEv., http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hcedfe/ (last visited
Oct. 9, 2010) ("HUD-approved housing counseling agencies are available to
provide you with the information and assistance you need to avoid
foreclosure.").
144. Weiner, supra note 2.
145.

See

generally

JOHN

O'SHAUGHNESSY

&

NICHOLAS

JACKSON

O'SHAUGHNESSY, THE MARKETING POWER OF EMOTION 61 (2003) (explaining that

individuals tend to uncritically endorse information that is in line with their
affective predispositions).
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disaster," says Odette Williamson a foreclosure lawyer at the
National Consumer Law Center.
Indeed, almost every media story on those who "walk away from
their mortgages" condemns the behavior as immoral and enlists
some "expert" to explain that "walking away" is, despite any claims
to the contrary, not only immoral but also a devastating event for
the homeowner: 147
A single missed mortgage payment ... knocks 100 points off
Every missed payment thereafter
your credit score.
compounds the damage.
A notice of default typically comes after the third missed
payment, delivering a knockout blow to the homeowner's
credit ...

The direct effect of any of these outcomes on credit scores
is dramatic, and it ripples through every corner of borrowers'
financial lives. The former homeowners will be unable to get
new credit at reasonable rates, and issuers of their existing
credit cards can raise interest rates because they are
148
considered greater risks.

146. Kiviat, supra note 2.
147. See, e.g., id. ("The whole idea of walking away is troubling to consumer
advocates, who worry that these firms are whitewashing the fact that
foreclosure is a traumatic experience-both financially and emotionally-that
takes years to recover from."). A Nightline broadcast warned:
The thing that homeowners have to take into consideration here is
that this is a real disaster for your credit, if you have a foreclosure on
your record, even default. But if you fall behind on your mortgage,
and don't pay it, everyone you go to borrow money from for the next
six or seven years is going to know about this. When you try to go for
a job, when you try to rent an apartment, this is going to be on your
credit. It's not like you walk away scot-free, you walk away with a
huge black mark on your credit rating.
Nightline: The Big Cut (ABC television broadcast Jan. 31, 2008), available at

http://abcnews.go.com/Video/playerIndex?id=4220208&affil=wxyz;

accord

Cavuto: The Deal: Walk Away From Your Home, supra note 2; Mortgage
Defaults in America: Can Pay, Won't Pay, ECONOMIST (June 25, 2009),

http://www.economist.com/node/13905502?storyjd=13905502 (recognizing the
moral barrier to default); Pulliam Weston, supra note 2; Squawk Box: Santelli's
Tea Party (CNBC television broadcast Feb. 19, 2009), available at
that
(emphasizing
http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=1039849853
defaulting on a mortgage is "bad behavior"); Schoen, supra note 2 ("The most
important reason [why it's a bad idea to walk away]: You signed a contract, took
the money and promised to pay the lender back. That's what the law now
requires you to do.... [Foreclosure] will ruin your credit rating. . . ."); Spruiell,
supranote 137; Streitfeld, supra note 2; Weiner, supra note 2.
148. Hasson, supra note 97. With a few notable exceptions, major media
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Similar warnings of disaster pervade the information given to
homeowners by housing-counseling agencies approved by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development," 9 such as the
following from the Anaheim Housing Counseling Agency:
Losing your home can be the worst and most devastating event
to you personally, and your credit history. This is a scenario
that you don't want to occur if you can avoid it! Not only will
you lose the comfort of your home and your investment, but a
Foreclosure will stay pending on your credit history for as long
as 10 years. This will jeopardize your ability to qualify for any
future home loan purchases, it may affect your ability to access
loans for car purchase and other needed purchases, and loan
costs are likely to be higher both in fees and interest paid. "o
As discussed above, fear alone is a powerful motivator. But
This may be
guilt and fear in combination are even more potent.'
coverage of an earlier version of this Article has followed this same scriptdespite the fact that this script was described in the earlier version of the

Article. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Harney, The Moral Dimensions of Ditching a
Mortgage, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2009, at El (describing the "incendiary core
message" of this Article and quoting Fannie Mae spokesman Brian Faith's
response that "there's a moral dimension to [walking away] as homeowners who
simply abandon their homes contribute to the destabilization of their
neighborhood and community," and Lewis Ranieri's (chief executive of several
major mortgage-related companies) criticism of the author as "incredibly
irresponsible and misinformed"); Liz Pulliam Weston, Are You Foolish To Pay
9,
2009),
MONEY
(Dec.
MSN
Your
Mortgage?,
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/HomeFinancing/Weston-should
-you-walk-away-from-your-home.aspx?page=1 (describing this Article and
responding that "walking away" is "wrong" and "an assault on our integrity and
our character"). For notable exceptions, see Roger Lowenstein, Just Walk
Away: Why Should UnderwaterHomeowners Behave Any Different from Banks?,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, (Magazine), at MM15 (advocating that underwater
homeowners consider walking away); and Richard H. Thaler, Underwater, but
Will They Leave the Pool?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 2010, at BU3.
149.

See,

e.g.,

Housing

Counseling, GREENPATH

DEBT

SOLUTIONS,

(last
http://www.greenpath.com/how-we-can-help/housing-counseling.htm
visited Oct. 9, 2010) ("Greenpath's housing counseling services can help you
preserve your most important asset, your home. After all, tenants, homeowners
and future home purchasers have a lot to lose if their finances get out of
control-and a lot to gain from housing counseling delivered by an unbiased
housing counselor.").
150. Default /Foreclosure, supra note 143; accord Foreclosure Prevention
FAQs, supra note 142 ("Foreclosures are extremely damaging to your credit and
may impact your credit rating for as long as seven years. A foreclosure can
make it difficult to get a loan for a future home purchase, college expenses, or to
get a major credit card. If you are able to get credit, your interest rates will
likely be higher. For most people, it is well worth the time and effort to avoid
foreclosure."); Weiner, supra note 2 (quoting Ellen Schloemer, Director of
Research at the Center for Responsible Lending, for the proposition that "[ilt
takes a decade to recover from a foreclosure").
151. See generally Lauren G. Block, Self-Referenced Fearand Guilt Appeals:
The Moderating Role of Self-Construal, 35 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 2290
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because most individuals have a deep-seated, if ill-defined, sense
that if they do "bad things," bad things will happen to them.
Whatever the psychological underpinnings, most people simply do
not believe they will escape punishment for their moral
transgressions. Guilt and fear of punishment go together. Thus, the
notion that one will suffer great consequences for walking away
from one's financial obligations not only seems possible, but feels
quite right. It just can't be that one can walk away from his
mortgage with no significant consequence. As such, people rarely
question apocalyptic descriptions of foreclosure's consequences.
As explored above, however, there is in fact a huge financial
upside to strategic default for seriously underwater homeownersan upside that is routinely ignored by the media, credit-counseling
agencies, and other political and economic institutions when
"informing" homeowners about the consequences of default.
Moreover, the costs of default are not nearly as extreme as these
same institutions typically misrepresent them to be. In reality,
homeowners face no risk of a deficiency judgment in many states,152
or for FHA loans regardless of the state;" 3 lenders are unlikely to
pursue a deficiency judgment even in recourse states because it is
154
there is no tax liability on
economically inefficient to do so;
"forgiven portions" of home mortgages under current federal tax law
in effect until 2012;1" defaulting on one's mortgage does not mean
that one's other credit lines will be revoked;"' and most people can
expect to recover from the negative impact of foreclosure on their
credit scores within a few years"' (and, meanwhile, a few years of
(2005); Francesco Mancini & Amelia Gangemi, The Role of Responsibility and
Fear of Guilt in Hypothesis-Testing, 37 J. BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL

PSYCHIATRY 333 (2006); Merunka et al., supra note 101 (concluding "that a
threatening message implying fear, guilt and shame together might well be the
most persuasive"); Kirsten A. Passyn & Mita Sujan, Self-Accountability
Emotions and Fear Appeals: Motivating Behavior, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 583
(2006) (arguing that messages that appeal to guilt and fear are more effective
deterrents on potentially harmful behavior than positive messages).
152. See Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential
Mortgage Default: Theory and Evidence from US. States 5 (Fed. Reserve Bank

of Richmond, Working Paper No. 09-10R, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1432437 (listing Alaska, Arizona, California, Iowa,
Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and
Wisconsin as nonrecourse states).
153. See id. at 3 (noting that deficiency judgments are barred for FHA
loans).
154. See Ralph Roberts, Top Myths About Loan Modification, REALTY TIMES
(Jan. 26, 2009), http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20090126_myths.htm; supra note
53 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
156. See Silberstein, supra note 49 (noting that one may rebound his or her
Fair Isaac Corporation score by keeping all other credit obligations in good
standing).
157. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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poor credit need not seriously impact one's life).
Homeowners with high credit scores, however, may have an
especially hard time accepting the notion that a few years of poor
credit is no big deal. The hard-to-convince include the vast majority
of homeowners with prime loans-94% of whom had credit scores
above 660 when they purchased their homes.' 58 Most American
homeowners see their good credit scores not only in utilitarian terms
(i.e., as helpful in increasing their purchasing power) but also as a
"source of pride," or a statement of their good moral character.xss
Indeed, the view that one's credit score reflects one's character, or at
least one's sense of responsibility and trustworthiness, is
widespread in American culture. 160 This belief is not surprising
given that the federal statute that governs credit reporting, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), describes credit reporting as a
"mechanism for investigating and evaluating the credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character,and general reputationof
161
consumers."
A bad credit score is, by design, meant to reflect not only one's
poor creditworthiness, but also one's poor moral character. For
individuals to lose their good credit is thus to lose not only "their
self-conceptions as people who keep their promises and pay their
debts on time," 1 but part of their "human worth" as well. "' Even
being "perceived as having bad credit"-such as having one's credit
card declined at a restaurant-is deeply humiliating to most
Americans.'" A bad credit score is nothing less than a reputational
scarlet letter that, because of the "omnipresence of the credit
165
As a
reporting system," follows individuals wherever they go.
result, Americans engage in a great deal of self-regulation to
maintain good credit scores. 166 The lending industry in turn "uses

158. See Avery et al., supra note 118, at 632 (noting that 93.6% of borrowers
with conventional, fixed-rate mortgages have credit scores in the high range,
meaning above 660).
159. See Dyal-Chand, supra note 111, at 815 ("[A] good credit score itself is
now something about which to be proud, and a bad credit score is something
about which to be ashamed.").
160. See id. at 811 n.94 ("[T]here appears to be a growing trend of using
credit reports as a proxy for screening and decision-making processes outside
the context of credit transactions, and in contexts where character was once
assessed in a more holistic manner. For instance, some relationship experts
now recommend using credit reports to evaluate the trustworthiness and
suitability of a potential romantic partner, while some businesses forego the
interview screening process entirely in favor of the information about an
individual that may be gleaned from a credit report.").
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
162. See Dyal-Chand, supranote 111, at 812.
163. See generally Dyal-Chand, supra note 111.

164. Id. at 815.
165. Id. at 809-10.
166. See id. at 811-12.
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credit scores as a threat" to constrain borrower behavior.167
This power to threaten borrowers means that, though mortgage
agreements in nonrecourse states contain an implied "put option"-a
contractual option to default and transfer ownership of the home to
the lender-the law plays a subordinate role in lender-borrower
relations. A borrower might in fact walk without legal penalty, but
the lender holds the borrower's human worth as collateral-and will
likely trash it in retaliation for the borrower's exercise of his or her
contractual right to default."' The credit-reporting system thus
subordinates the law to social norms and makes it impossible for a
strategic defaulter to avoid the reputational penalty of default, even
by packing up and moving across the country. Indeed, for seven
years, perfect strangers who access the defaulter's credit report will
learn of the moral misdeed and express their disapproval, if only by
changing their tone of voice in the way that individuals tend to do
when addressing someone of a lesser social status. 69
In short, although the financial sting of a temporarily poor
credit score may be relatively easy to mitigate, 170 the damage to
one's reputation and sense of self-worth may be both more intense
and more enduring. This reality brings the question back full circle
to whether seriously underwater homeowners may be acting in
utility-maximizing ways by not walking away from their mortgages.
Indeed they may be, if emotional suffering is a mere transaction cost
of default. But assessing whether the behavior is utility-maximizing
misses the point. The point is that the credit-reporting system
operates in conjunction with other economic, political, and social
institutions as a means of social control by increasing the emotional
cost of default. Moreover, the credit-reporting system operates
largely outside of the legal process as a norm enforcer,17 ensuring
167. Id. at 811.

168. See id. at 815 ("In the consumer context, the connection between credit
reports, credit, and social status provides a means of eliminating a person's
sense of honor. Simply put, by reporting negative information to a credit
bureau, a lender can limit a borrower's acquisition of status-enhancing goods
and services, and more basically, lower her social standing.").
169. Seven years is the length of time that the fact of the foreclosure
remains on an individual's credit report (though its effect on the actual score
will effectively disappear long before then). See FED. TRADE COMM'N, BUILDING A
BETTER CREDIT REPORT 9 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs
/consumer/credit/cre03.pdf; Silberstein, supra note 49.
170. For example, one might make any purchases for which one will
foreseeably need credit before default and use a debit card in place of a credit
card for purchases and rental car reservations after default.
171. The credit-reporting system is governed by the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681
(2006). The "system" consists of a "consumer report," defined by the FCRA as:
any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation,
personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to
be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a
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immediate reputational punishment for those individuals who might
be tempted to flout their "moral commitment to pay" by exercising
their legal right to default.
V. THE ASYMMETRY OF HOMEOWNER AND LENDER NORMS
One obvious response to the above discussion is that society
benefits when people honor their financial obligations and behave
according to social and moral norms, rather than strictly legal or
market norms. This may be true if lenders behaved according to the
same social and moral norms. In the case of lender-borrower
behavior, however, there is a clear imbalance in placing personal
responsibility on the borrower to honor his "promise to pay" in order
to relieve the lender of its agreement to take back the home in lieu
of payment. Given lenders' generally superior knowledge and
understanding of both mortgage instruments and valuation of real
estate, it seems only fair to hold them to the benefit of their bargain.
At a basic level, sound underwriting of mortgage loans requires
lenders to ensure that a loan is sufficiently collateralized in the
event of default.'72 In other words, in appraising a home, the lender
should ensure that the loan amount, at the least, does not exceed
the intrinsic market value of the home.
As discussed above, a textbook premise of economics is that a
home's value, even that of an owner-occupied one, is "the current
value of the rent payments that could be earned from renting the
property at market prices."' As such, historical home prices have
hewed nationally to a price-to-annual-rent ratio of roughly fifteento-one.174 At the peak of the market, however, price-to-rent ratios
reached fifty-one-to-one in the most inflated markets, and the
If personal
national average reached twenty-three-to-one."'7
responsibility is the operative value, then lenders who ignored basic
economic principles (of which they should have been aware) should
bear at least equal responsibility with homeowners for the
foreclosure crisis, as they issued collateralized loans that were far in
excess of the intrinsic value of the home.
Moreover, since lenders generally arrange the appraisal (for
which homebuyers must pay) and homebuyers rely on the lender to
ensure that the home is worth the purchase price,176 one might
factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for credit or
insurance ... or any other purpose [permitted by the FCRA].
Id. § 1681a(d)(1) (footnote omitted).
172.

See,

e.g.,

Mortgage

Loan

Underwriting,

FIN.

WEB,

http://www.finweb.com/mortgage-loan-education/mortgage-loan
-underwriting.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
173. RHO ET AL., supra note 27, at 3.
174. Id. at 4 & n.3.
175. Where Housing Is Headed, FORTUNE, http://money.cnn.com/magazines

/fortune/price rent ratios/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
176. See James Hagerty, ReappraisingHome Appraisers, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
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argue that lenders should bear much more than 50% responsibility
for the bad investment of the homeowner and lender. As Joseph
Stiglitz has explained, "[Flor the most part, the lenders were, or
should have been, far more financially sophisticated than the
borrowers. .. ."" Lenders "should [thus] be made to bear the
consequences of their failures to assess risk."'78
Indeed, lenders' mortgage-default-risk models have long shown
that the loan-to-value ratio is a critical determinant of default
risk."1
Lender underwriting practices thus traditionally required
that homeowners have sufficient equity (usually by requiring a
sufficient down payment) such that default would never be the "inthe-money option.,"' Lenders relaxed this requirement, however, as
credit-default models showed that few borrowers were "ruthless,"
meaning that would few borrowers default as soon as the loan value
exceeds the market value of the home.' 8 ' Lenders thus moved
toward models that relied heavily on credit history as the predictor
of default risk. These models showed, for example, that only 0.9% of
borrowers with "high" credit scores and 4% of borrowers with
"medium" credit scores would default on their mortgages.182 This led
lenders to conclude that default risk was sufficiently low for
borrowers with high and medium credit scores that lenders could
profitably offer a variety of alternative mortgage products, including
zero-down loans, interest-only ARMs, and negative amortization
loans. 183

In other words, lenders lost sight of the importance of positive
equity in lowering the risk of mortgage default, and failed to ensure
that homes were actually worth what they were being purchased
for.'84 This is not to say that lenders are solely responsible for the
18, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702034968045743487
12795471006.html ("Appraisals are supposed to shield home buyers from
paying too much and lenders from overestimating the value of collateral. If
appraisals come in too high, buyers may overpay, making defaults more
likely.").
177. Memorandum from Joseph E. Stiglitz, Chair, Comm'n of Experts of the
President of the U.N. Gen. Assembly on Reforms of the Int'l Monetary and Fin.
Sys. to Comm'n on Foreclosures [hereinafter Memorandum from Joseph E.
Stiglitz], availableat www.un-ngls.org/docs/ga/cfr/memo-foreclosure.pdf.
178. Id.
179. Vandell, supra note 61, at 215 (citing academic work validating the
effect of initial loan-to-value ratio in influencing default).
180. See id. at 212-13, 218.
181. See id. at 224 (finding that the first option-based models overestimated
the ruthless default of homeowners in comparison to that what was actually
observable in the market).
182. See Avery et al., supra note 118, at 632.
183. See Vandell, supra note 61, at 220-23.
184. See, e.g., Boom, Bust and Blame - The Inside Story of America's
Economic Crisis - By the Numbers, CNBC.coM, http://www.cnbc.com/id

/32756455/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) ("Financial institutions big and small got
caught up in the lending frenzy. Some were fly-by-night operations that made
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housing run-up and bust, but that they do in fact bear a substantial
portion of the blame-and thus should bear a substantial portion of
the cost."' One might argue, in fact, that the value of personal
responsibility would require lenders to own up to their share of the
blame and work with underwater homeowners by voluntarily
writing off some of the negative equity.
But lenders, of course, do not operate according to norms of
personal responsibility, and seek instead to maximize profit (or
minimize losses). Indeed, to the extent that the lender is a
corporation, the directors and executives of the corporation have a
legal duty to shareholders to maximize profit and minimize losses.'86
It is this loss-minimizing behavior, in fact, that drives banks to
strategically default on their own properties when it is economically
efficient to do so (such as Morgan Stanley's highly publicized default
on five properties in San Francisco 8 ' and the Mortgage Bankers
Association's short sale of its former building in Washington,
D.C. 188)
This moral double standard aside, it has been suggested that
given the great cost of foreclosure to lenders, lenders should have an
economic incentive to modify loans for homeowners in danger of
default."' 9 This argument has flown in the face of the reality,
millions through questionable loans. Others were well-known firms with strong
reputations, blinded by the promise of huge mortgage profits."); Boom, Bust and
Blame - The Inside Story of America's Economic Crisis - Subprime Explosion,

CNBC.cOM, http://www.cnbc.com/id/31189225 (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
185. Of course, others share in the blame as well, including mortgage
brokers and appraisers who in certain instances conspired to inflate home

values. See, e.g., Laura Misjak, Heintz Mortgage FraudCase Involved Inflated
Property Values in Grand Blanc, Davison, MLIVE.COM (Feb. 18, 2010),

http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2010/02/heintz-mortgage fraudcase
_inv.html; Larry Neumeister, 41 People in 4 States Charged in Mortgage Fraud,
15, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id
ABcNEWS, Oct.
=8835204. Buyers' real estate agents, who pushed buyers to buy at inflated
prices and failed to warn of an impending bust that they knew, or should have
known, was coming-or at the very least failed to inform buyers once monthly
trends began to show declining prices-are similarly blameworthy. See David
Streitfeld, Feeling Misled on Home Price, Buyers Are Suing Their Agent, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at Al.
186. See Michael J. O'Hara, Governing for Genuine Profit, 36 VAND. J.

L. 765, 767 (2003) (delimiting the obligations of the fiduciaries of a
corporation).
TRANSNAT'L

187. See Shahien Nasiripour, Don't Look Back: Major Players Continue To
'Walk Away' from Poor Mortgages, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2010),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/25/dont-look-back-major-play-n
435965.html.

188. See Claire Shipman & Mary Pflum, Is It Wrong To Walk Away from a
Mortgage Deep Underwater?: Debate Grows as Housing Crisis Continues,

(Feb. 11, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/mortgage-defaults
-borrowers-walk-away-underwater-home/story?id=9802435.
189. MORTG. BANKERS AsS'N, LENDERS' COST OF FoRECLOsuRE 4-5 (2008),
ABCNEWS

available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0805FORECLOSUREMORTGAGE
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however, that lenders have been reluctant to modify loans, even for
borrowers in the preforeclosure process. 1o
Recent studies seeking to explain this apparently irrational
behavior have shown that lenders are simply operating to maximize
profit and minimize losses, just as they would be expected to do.'
First, lenders know that borrowers with high credit scores are
unlikely to default even at high levels of negative equity.192 To
modify loans for these homeowners would be to throw money away
and to encourage more homeowners to ask for modifications.
Second, a significant number of homeowners who temporarily
default on their mortgages "self cure" without any help from their
lender' 9 3-though self-cure rates have dropped precipitously in the
Again, to modify the loans of individuals who
last two years.
would otherwise self cure would be to throw away money. Third,
homeowners who have poor credit, or who end up in arrears because
of "triggering events," such as unemployment, divorce, or other
financially devastating circumstances, are likely to default on the
modified loan as well.'" To modify loans for these individuals is to
waste time and risk housing prices falling further before the lender
eventually has to foreclose and sell the property anyway.
Given these economic incentives for the lender, a seriously
underwater homeowner with good credit and a solid mortgage
.PDF (explaining that foreclosure is a prohibitively costly exercise for the

mortgage industry as it involves significant lost payments on principal and
interest, as well as necessitates legal, administrative, and property
maintenance fees, all of which are incurred by the lender).
190. See Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Why Don't
Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? The Effect of Securitization 1-2

(Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2009-17a, 2010), available at
http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/pubs/wp/wp0917a.pdf (finding that less
than 2% of all delinquent loans receive modification within the first year
following delinquency).
191. See, e.g., id. at 32; see also Foote et al., supra note 17, at 1 ("While
investors might be foreclosing when it would be socially efficient to modify,
there is little evidence to suggest they are acting against their own interests
when they do so.").
192. See Avery et al., supra note 118, at 632; Foote et al., supra note 17, at
12-17.
193. See Foote et al., supra note 17, at 2 ("Investors also lose money when
they modify mortgages for borrowers who would have repaid anyway, especially
if modifications are done en masse, as proponents insist they should be.").
194. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 1, at 12 (recognizing the
decline in self-cure rates).
195. See Foote et al., supra note 17, at 2 ("Moreover, the calculation [that
lenders are acting against their own interest] ignores the possibility that
borrowers with modified loans will default again later, usually for the same
reason they defaulted in the first place."); see also Adelino, Gerardi & Willen,
supra note 190, at 19 n.25 (noting that unemployment is a very important
determinant of a borrower's decision to default); Deng, Quigley & Van Order,
supra note 80, at 290 (recognizing "triggering events" such as divorce and
unemployment as contributing to the default decision).
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payment history who responsibly calls his lender to work out a loan
modification is likely to be told by his lender that it will not discuss
a loan modification until the homeowner is thirty days or more
delinquent on his mortgage payment. 196 The lender is making a bet
(and a good one) that the homeowner values his credit score too
much to miss a payment and will just give up the idea of a loan
modification. However, if the homeowner does what the lender
suggests, misses a payment, and calls back to discuss a loan
modification in thirty days, the homeowner is likely to be told to call
back when he is ninety days delinquent. 97 In the meantime, the
lender may send the borrower a series of strongly worded notices
reminding him of his moral obligation to pay and threatening legal
action, including foreclosure and a deficiency judgment, if the
homeowner does not bring his mortgage payments current.s98 The
lender is again making a bet (and again a good one) that the
homeowner will be shamed or frightened into paying his mortgage.
If the homeowner calls the lender's bluff and calls back when he is
ninety days delinquent, there is a good possibility that he will be
told that his credit score is now so low that he does not qualify for a
loan modification.'9 9 The homeowner must then decide whether to
bring the loan current or face foreclosure. If the homeowner
somehow makes clear to the lender that he has chosen foreclosure,
the lender may finally be willing to negotiate a loan modification, a
short sale, or a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure-all of which still leave
the homeowner's credit in tatters (at least temporarily).
Most lenders will, in other words, take full advantage of the
asymmetry of norms between lender and homeowner and will use
the threat of damaging the borrower's credit score to bring the
homeowner into compliance. Additionally, many lenders will only
bargain when the threat of damaging the homeowner's credit has
lost its force and it becomes clear to the lender that foreclosure is
imminent absent some accommodation.200 On a fundamental level,
the asymmetry of moral norms for borrowers and market norms for
196. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, My Personal Credit Crisis, N.Y. TnMES,
May 17, 2009, (Magazine), at MM46 (describing the author's efforts to
renegotiate his mortgage with his lender).
197. See, e.g., id.
198. See Marlon Baugh, The Notice of Default - This Is When a Foreclosure
Begins, EZINE ARTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?The-Notice-of-Default-This

-is-When-a-Foreclosure-Begins?&id=3303141 (last visited Oct. 9, 2010)
(discussing the letters lenders send to scare borrowers into paying their
mortgage).
199. See How Banks View Loan Modifications, MANDELMAN MATTERS,
http://mandelman.ml-implode.com/2009/11/how-banks-view-loan-modification/
(last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (giving an anecdotal account of how banks treat
borrowers who seek to modify their loans).
200. See Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The
Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 CoNN. L. REV.

1107, 1113-14 (2009).
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lenders gives lenders an unfair advantage in negotiations related to
the enforcement of contractual rights and obligations, including the
borrower's right to exercise the "put option." This imbalance is
exaggerated by the credit-reporting system, which gives lenders the
power to threaten borrowers' human worth and social status by
damaging their credit scores-scores that serve as much as grades
for moral character as they do for creditworthiness. 20 ' The result is
a predictable imbalance in which individual homeowners have borne
a huge and disproportionate burden of the housing collapse.
VI. LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
While the federal government has given billions to bail out
financial institutions,20 2 the primary assistance that it has offered to
underwater homeowners has been allowing them to refinance up to
125% of their home's current value at today's lower interest rates, if
they are current on their mortgage and their original loan was
Additionally, for
insured by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae.203
homeowners who are "at risk of imminent default," the Treasury
Department has encouraged lenders to voluntarily modify loans so
that borrower payments do not exceed 31% of their total monthly
income.

In

order to incentivize such loan modifications, the

Treasury Department has offered lenders $1000 for each eligible
mortgage they modify, plus $1000 per year for three years as long as
the borrower remains in the program.205 Additionally, once the
lender has absorbed the cost of reducing the monthly debt-to-income
ratio to 38%, the Treasury Department will share the cost, dollarfor-dollar, of reducing the ratio further to 31%.206
Government policy makers have premised this approach on two
central tenets: (1) that the key to preventing foreclosures is to
ensure that mortgage payments are affordable; and (2) that the
severity of the foreclosure crisis in the United States is due in large
part to lenders' unwillingness to renegotiate mortgages to make
them more affordable."' Policy makers have grounded this singleminded focus of affordability on studies from earlier, less severe,
201. See supra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
PROPUBLICA,
Bailouts,
Gov't
of
U.S.
History
202. See
http://www.propublica.org/special/government-bailouts (last visited Oct. 9,
2010).
203. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Secretary
Donovan Announces Expanded Eligibility for Making Home Affordable
Refinancing (July 1, 2009), available at http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal
/HUD/press/press-releasesmediaadvisories/2009/HUDNo.09-104.
204. See Memorandum for U.S. Dep't of Treasury on Making Home
Affordable 3-4 (Mar. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Making Home Affordable Memo],
availableat http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/housing-facLsheet.pdf.
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id.
207. See Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 190, at 1.
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housing busts that showed that borrowers with affordable
mortgages rarely default. 201
There are several problems, however, with focusing on
affordability alone as the key to averting the worsening of the
foreclosure crisis.
First, government programs have defined
"unaffordable" as a total monthly payment exceeding 30% of one's
gross monthly income. 209 This arbitrary cutoff does not account for
the reality that even if one's payment doesn't exceed 30% of one's
gross monthly income, paying, for example, $3000 a month for a
home that could be purchased or rented today for around $1000 a
month is financially unwise. Or as "economists might argue . .. an

unaffordable mortgage is one that is really too expensive, in the
sense that the benefits that come with making payments on the
mortgage no longer outweigh the opportunity costs of doing so." 2 10
To account for this fact, "affordable" might instead be defined not
only according to one's gross income, but also in relation to the fair
rental value of one's home. A home that costs three times more to
own than it would to rent would be by definition unaffordable. On
the other hand, a home that costs less to own than it would to rent
might be not too expensive even if the payment exceeds 30% of one's
gross monthly income, as long as one could make the payment with
room to spare.
Conversely, paying 30% of gross monthly income for a mortgage
will leave many middle-to-low-income individuals with little to
spare, especially if those individuals have other significant financial
obligations, such as child care or medical bills. Indeed, leaving aside
monthly budget concerns, 30% (or even 20%) of one's income is a
significant percentage if the payment is essentially being thrown
away into a large negative-equity hole out of which one is not likely
to dig. Once a home has become an albatross instead of an
investment, struggling to pay a mortgage makes no financial sense,
For many
almost regardless of one's monthly payment.
homeowners, technical affordability is not the lone consideration.
Relative affordability and negative equity both matter as well-and
once negative equity is severe enough, it may overwhelm other
considerations.
Recognizing this reality, a number of proposals have been put
forth to address the relative affordability and negative equity
problems. Joseph Stiglitz has suggested, for example, that the
government should itself become a lender and issue mortgages at
low interest rates, which would help address the relative
208. See Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 16, at 5.
209. See, e.g., Affordable Housing, U.S. DEPARTMENT HOUSING & URB. DEV.,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 9,
2010) ("The generally accepted definition of affordability is for a household to
pay no more than 30 percent of its annual income on housing.").
210. See Foote et al., supra note 17, at 4.
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affordability issue and partially compensate for negative equity.
Others have suggested that the government use stimulus funds to
buy down underwater mortgages212 or assist homeowners through
grants that would cover a portion of their payments.2 "' Each of
these proposals would bring some balance to the government's
current approach to the mortgage crisis by providing direct
assistance to homeowners, as opposed to injecting money into the
banking system in hopes that some of the benefit will trickle down
in the form of greater credit availability. Equally as important,
these proposals would circumvent the problems created by norm
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders because borrowers could
go to the government for help regardless of their lender's willingness
to renegotiate.
In contrast to a government bailout of underwater homeowners,
other proposals would force lenders to write off some of the principal
of underwater mortgages without the government picking up the
tab. For example, Adam Levitin has proposed allowing bankruptcy
judges to write down mortgages on primary residences,214 which is
prohibited under current bankruptcy law. 215 This proposal, too, is a
step in the right direction in that it would help compensate for the
problems of norm asymmetry by eliminating the need for borrowers
to negotiate with lenders. However, Levitin's proposal would help
only underwater homeowners who qualified for bankruptcy and
211. Stiglitz has argued that such a program would allow the government to
earn a return on these mortgages and incentivize the mortgage industry to
compete by restructuring loan terms. See Memorandum from Joseph E.
Stiglitz, supra note 177. However, in order to adequately compensate for
negative equity, especially for homeowners who are hundreds of thousands of
dollars underwater, interest rates would have to be truly low-somewhere
around 2-3%.
212. See, e.g., Rebel A. Cole, The Housing-Asset Relief Program: A Plan for
Stabilizing the Housing and Securities Markets (Apr. 22, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338883 (proposing that
"$300 billion in TARP or stimulus funds" be "used to write down the principals
on [underwater] mortgages").
213. See generally, e.g., Chris Foote et al., A Proposal To Help Distressed
Homeowners: A Government Payment-Sharing Plan (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos.,
Paper No. 09-1, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1432514 (proposing
a "government payment-sharing arrangement" under which the government
would pay part of the homeowner's existing mortgage, providing a "significant
reduction in the homeowner's monthly mortgage payment").
214. See Adam Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of
Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 565, 565 (arguing for modification
of home-mortgage debt in bankruptcy proceedings); cf Eric A. Posner & Luigi
Zingales, The Housing Crisis and Bankruptcy Reform: The Prepackaged
Chapter 13 Approach 8-9 (Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus. Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 09-11; Univ. of Chi., Olin Law & Econ. Program Research
available at
459,
2009),
No.
Working Paper
Paper Series,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349364 (discussing a similar proposal from Senator
Richard Durbin).
215. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006).
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could show that they could not "afford" their mortgage payments. It
would thus fail to assist many responsible underwater homeowners
who did not reach beyond their means, but simply purchased at the
wrong time.
Partially in response to this concern, Eric Posner and Luigi
Zingales have suggested changing federal bankruptcy law to allow
"prepackaged," or streamlined, mortgage cramdowns under Chapter
Under Posner and Zingales's
13 of the Bankruptcy Code. 1
intriguing proposal, any homeowner who lives in a zip code where
the median home price has dropped by more than 20% from its peak
would have the right to submit a "Chapter 13 prepack." 217 This
prepack "would simply contain a new mortgage amount that is equal
to the old mortgage amount discounted by the percentage decline of
the median house price for the zip code. Monthly payments would
decline by the same percentage; the term of the mortgage would not
be changed."2 1 ' The creditor would not have the right to oppose the
prepack, 21 9 but would be entitled to a percentage of the home's
appreciation upon sale-a percentage equal to the percentage
reduction in the principal pursuant to the prepack.22 0
Like the Levitin proposal, the prepackage bankruptcy would be
a positive step in circumventing the barriers to renegotiation caused
by norm asymmetry. The prepack also has several advantages
when compared to the Levitin proposal, including that it would
impose less of a burden on the courts because the prepackage
bankruptcy would be "automated, requiring only a rubber stamp by
a bankruptcy judge."22 ' Nevertheless, the prepack proposal has
significant drawbacks as well, including that it would intrude ex
post into the contractual relationship of private parties and would
create additional administrative burdens for already overburdened
bankruptcy courts.
It is also a blunt instrument in that it
arbitrarily limits cramdowns to zip codes where prices have declined
20% and does not account for the often great variation of
depreciation within a single zip code.2 2
While both the Posner and Zingales proposal and the Levitin
proposal are worth considering, understanding norm asymmetry
suggests other possibilities. One solution that naturally follows, for
example, would be for the government-or more likely some
216. See generally Posner & Zingales, supra note 214.
217. Id. at 21.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 21-22.
220. Id. at 22.
221. Id. at 1.
222. Id. at 20.
The plan would thus be both overinclusive and
underinclusive, allowing some owners a write-down even when their particular
neighborhood had not experienced declines exceeding the magical 20% cutoff,
but denying relief to others whose neighborhoods had experienced steep
declines, but whose overall zip code had fared better than a 20% decline.
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consumer-advocacy group-to begin a public education campaign
encouraging underwater homeowners to walk if their lenders are
unwilling to negotiate. At a minimum, federally approved and
supported housing- and credit-counseling agencies should cease
sending the fear-laden message that foreclosure should be avoided
at all costs.' 23 They should also provide accurate information about
the likelihood of deficiency judgments, 224 extent of tax liabilities, 225
In other words, the
and recovery time for credit scores.226
government should at least stop perpetuating scary myths about the
consequences of foreclosure and tone down its moral rhetoric.
Given the credit-rating system's role in enforcing norm
asymmetry, however, additional steps might be necessary to level
the playing field between borrowers and lenders and to empower
Stated
homeowners to renegotiate underwater mortgages.
to
lenders'
ability
to
curb
should
be
taken
some
steps
differently,
To
for
the
loan.
collateral
scores
as
substitute
credit
hold borrowers'
explain, in the case of an underwater mortgage, the portion of the
mortgage above the home's present value effectively becomes
unsecured debt. Lenders compensate for this by holding the
underwater homeowner's credit score as the new collateral, and
threaten to ruin it in response to the borrower's exercise of the
contractual default option.227 Not only does this alter the underlying
agreement that the home alone serves as collateral, but also,
because many underwater homeowners highly value their credit
scores,228 this frequently allows lenders to use the "credit threat" to
reap the benefit, but escape the costs, of their bargain. 229 Borrowers,
of course, lack any similar leverage over lenders.
One solution to remedy this imbalance would be to amend the
FCRA to prevent lenders from reporting mortgage defaults and

223. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
224. See supranote 152 and accompanying text.

225. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

227. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
228. See supranotes 159-66 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text. The contractual option
to default, also known as the "put option," should be particularly robust in

antideficiency judgment states, such as Arizona and California, where
borrowers pay on average an extra $800 in closing costs per $100,000 borrowed
for the option to default without lender recourse beyond taking possession of the
collateral itself. See SUSAN E. WOODWARD, A STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS FOR FHA
MORTGAGES 51-52 (2008), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf
/FHAclosing-cost.pdf. Even in a recourse state, however, the borrower has the
implied option to default and leave the lender to pursue whatever legal
remedies may be available, including foreclosure and a deficiency judgment.
Because these legal remedies are generally unattractive to lenders, they prefer
to use extrajudicial measures such as threatening a borrower's credit score to
induce them to forego the exercise of the default option. See supra notes 196-99
and accompanying text.
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foreclosures to credit-rating agencies.230 While this proposal is not
the only possible solution, eliminating the credit threat may in fact
be the key to eliminating norm asymmetry between lenders and
borrowers, thereby forcing a more equitable division of the financial
burden of the housing-market collapse. It might also help prevent
the foreclosure crisis from spreading.
As a practical matter, preventing lenders from reporting
mortgage defaults to credit-rating agencies would eliminate lenders'
ability to collateralize the borrower's credit score and threaten it in
retaliation for the borrower's exercise of the "put option."23 1 It would
thus help considerably in leveling the playing field between lenders
and borrowers. With the threat of damage to the borrower's credit
score removed, the borrower could more credibly threaten to walk
away absent a principal reduction. It bears emphasizing, however,
that the borrower would be unlikely to bargain "ruthlessly" because,
even without the credit reputation hit, there are significant
transaction costs to moving and finding a new home.232 Indeed,
because of these costs and attachment to one's home, 233 few
homeowners would walk at less than 10% negative equity.234
Thus, if a mortgage was underwater, for example, by 20%, the
lender and homeowner might agree to share equally in absorbing
the loss, or a homeowner might agree to absorb all of the negative
equity in exchange for a reduction in the interest rate. The parties
might also agree to condition any reduction in principal on the
lender sharing in future appreciation-in effect converting the
mortgage into a shared equity loan. In other words, the lender and
homeowner would be free to negotiate a mutually beneficial
230. Ideally, this change would be coupled with an extension beyond the
year 2012 of the federal tax waiver on "forgiven" portions of one's mortgage, and
a national antideficiency statute barring lenders from pursuing homeowners for
Though not without
a mortgage's unsatisfied portion upon foreclosure.
controversy, extending the tax waiver and passing an antideficiency statute
would address the underlying economic costs of default to the borrower and,
other consequences aside, it should therefore be self-explanatory why these
measures would help improve borrowers' bargaining position.
231. Such a change would also serve as an important signal from the
government, sending the message that a borrower who exercises a contractual
right to default should not be viewed as immoral or irresponsible.
232. See Avery et al., supra note 118, at 622.
233. Indeed, lenders benefit not only from borrowers' negative emotions such
as guilt and fear, but also from borrowers' positive attachment to the idea of
homeownership. This emotional attachment to homeownership is socially
cultivated and has been internalized by most Americans, who generally see
homeownership as both a good investment and an integral part of the American
Dream and thus may cling to their homes when they could walk away, rent
something nicer, and put the money they save into an investment with better
returns. See Talk of the Nation: Re-thinking American Dream of Home
Ownership (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php ?storyld=121472986.
234. Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 16, at 21.
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arrangement to continue the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship, or
to settle for the benefit of their original bargain and allow mortgagor
to have the house.
Additionally, this approach would have significant advantages
over Posner and Zingales's proposal for forced cramdowns. First, it
would allow the parties to come to their own mutually agreeable
solution to the negative equity problem, without the government
intruding into a private contractual relationship and rewriting the
contract. Second, it would allow for nuanced, borrower-specific
solutions, rather than across-the-board treatment for whole zip
codes, or arbitrary cut-offs based on a set percentage of the
borrower's gross monthly income. Third, it would not require the
government to create a new bureaucratic structure or expend any
taxpayer money, nor would it impose new regulations on lenders.
The proposal simply identifies a distortion in the market created by
Indeed, the
norm asymmetry and eliminates that distortion.
proposal to eliminate the credit threat is, at heart, a market-based
solution. It should thus be preferable to a government bailout of
homeowners or a government takeover of the lending industry.23 5
By the same token, it should be attractive to consumer advocates, as
it protects the credit of underwater homeowners and gives them
236
more leverage to negotiate.
Nevertheless, some might still object that eliminating the credit
217
threat would encourage default among underwater homeowners.
235. The proposal is, of course, not likely to satisfy those who believe
homeowners have a moral obligation to pay their mortgage regardless of
whether it would be more efficient to breach. Nor, it goes without saying, is the
proposal going to be welcomed by the lending industry.
236. There is already a large and growing industry devoted to helping
underwater homeowners negotiate write-downs with lenders. As evidence of
the size of this industry, there have been "massive numbers of complaints" in
California against lawyers who have taken fees to renegotiate mortgages and
have failed to deliver. See Jim Wasserman, Loan Modification Firms Banned
BEE, Oct. 13, 2009,

from Demanding Upfront Fees, SACRAMENTO

http://www.sacbee.com/2009/10/13/2249150/loan-modification-firms
-banned.html. As a result, lawmakers in California passed legislation to bar
up-front fees for mortgage renegotiation services. See S. 94, 2009 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2009). It thus seems fair to say that eliminating the credit threat
would at a minimum help the thousands of people who are already trying to
negotiate with their lenders but finding they have little leverage unless they are
willing to signal their willingness to walk by missing payments and sacrificing
their credit scores.
237. Rather than objecting that eliminating the credit threat would
encourage default among underwater homeowners, others are likely to argue
the opposite-namely, that eliminating the credit threat would do nothing to
alter homeowner behavior. This objection would be grounded on surveys that
have shown that many people don't understand what a credit score is, much
less care about their own. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making
Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008) ("Survey evidence also suggests
that '[miost consumers do not understand what credit scores measure, what
good and bad scores are, and how scores can be improved.'" (quoting Press
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But that is, in part, the point: in an environment in which there was
less stigma attached to default and homeowners could more credibly
threaten to walk away, lenders would be more willing to negotiate
with underwater homeowners. The end result would paradoxically
be fewer defaults, as homeowners would not feel compelled-or be
told-to default before the lender would negotiate. Moreover, even if
there were more initial defaults, fewer of these defaults would end
in foreclosures, as a missed payment would signal the homeowner's
seriousness to the lender and bring the lender more quickly to the
bargaining table. This would stand in sharp contrast to the current
environment in which lenders often have an economic incentive not
to work with borrowers, on the theory that the vast majority of those
who threaten to default will not follow through and that modifying
mortgages of underwater homeowners will simply encourage more

Release, Consumer Fed'n of Am. & Providian, Most Consumers Do Not
Understand Credit Scores According to a New Comprehensive Survey (2004)
at
available
Release],
Press
Score
Credit
[hereinafter
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/finance/092104
creditscores.PDF)). However, credit knowledge surveys have not assessed the
subset of people with high credit scores to see what they know or how they feel
about credit scores (and, as discussed above, 94% of people with prime loans
have high credit scores). See supra note 158 and accompanying text. The
subset of the population with high credit scores likely cares more and knows
more about credit scores than does the general population. Moreover, despite
headlines to the contrary, credit-knowledge surveys have actually shown that a
very significant portion of the population does in fact understand the
importance of good credit, cares about their credit scores, and understands the
basics of credit reporting. See, e.g., U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CREDIT
REPORTING LITERACY: CONSUMERS UNDERSTOOD THE BASICS BUT COULD BENEFIT
available at
(2005),
11
EFFORTS
EDUCATIONAL
TARGETED
FROM

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05223.pdf (reporting that 70% of respondents
correctly defined a credit score); Credit Score Press Release, supra (concluding
that most consumers do not understand credit scores despite finding that "most
customers surveyed correctly understand that lenders use credit scores," 34%
correctly understand that credit scores measure credit risk as opposed to ability
to pay, and 60% correctly understand how to improve their credit score); Poll:
Consumers Don't Understand Credit Reporting,Favor Reforms, INS. J. (Aug. 11,

http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2003/08/11/31410.htm
2003),
(finding that consumers don't understand many specifics of credit reporting but
that 97% understand that they have the right to see their credit report, 81%
know that consumers who fail to qualify for a loan have the right to a free credit
report, 46% understand that in most states they must pay a fee to obtain their
credit report, 45% understand that their credit score may be lowered if they use
all of the credit available on their credit card, and 73% understand that their
credit score measures their credit-worthiness). Individuals who care about and
understand their credit score likely constitute a much more significant portion
of people with prime loans (which is only one subset of individuals about which
this proposal is concerned) than of the general population. Moreover, one does
not really need to understand much about one's credit score to not want to mess
it up-and even the most ignorant homeowner likely knows a foreclosure will
hurt his credit. It thus makes sense that removing the credit threat would alter
the behavior of at least a significant minority of underwater homeowners.
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The proposal's value in forcing lenders to negotiate should not
be underestimated. Indeed, "[sleveral major policy actions to date
have involved encouraging lenders, in one way or another, to
renegotiate loan terms in order to reduce borrower debt loads.""
This includes, of course, the Making Home Affordable program,
which tries to encourage renegotiation by offering modest financial
incentives to lenders.2 40 As the paucity of loan modifications under
this program evidences,24 1 however, offering lenders a few thousand
dollars to modify delinquent loans does not alter the underlying
economic incentives or the lender-borrower dynamic that drives
lenders to prefer foreclosure to renegotiation.
Voluntary
renegotiation of home mortgages has remained the elusive "public
policy holy grail." 243 This failure to effectively encourage voluntary
renegotiation has stemmed, at least in part, from policy makers'
failure to appreciate the role of norm asymmetry in lenders'
unwillingness to negotiate with borrowers (at least until borrowers
have shown their willingness to sacrifice their credit scores).
Eliminating the credit threat may thus, in fact, be part of the key to
unlocking the holy grail of voluntary renegotiation.
Despite these benefits, one might still object to the proposal on
the theory that the lender's ability to collateralize borrowers' credit
scores reduces risk to the lender, thereby allowing them to offer
lower interest rates.244 Thus, the argument would go, eliminating
238. Even a relatively modest increase in the number of credible threats of
default could alter the economic calculation for lenders that currently causes
them not to renegotiate. Such would be the likely outcome of removing the
credit threat, as the signaling function of a late payment would be less costly to
borrowers, meaning that many more people would default if necessary in order
to bring lenders to the table. But it should be emphasized that the increase in
defaults would likely be temporary, as lenders would soon comprehend that it
would be less costly to negotiate with borrowers who threaten default before
they actually stop making payment.
239. Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 190, at 1.
240. See Making Home Affordable Memo, supra note 204.
241. Though the Treasury Department predicted that this programs would
offer assistance to seven to nine million homeowners, id., only 360,165 loan
modifications had taken place under the program as of August 2009. MAKING
HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM: SERVICER PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH AUGUST

2009 (2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/MHA-Public_090909.pdf
242. See Adelino, Gerardi & Willen, supra note 190, at 1 ("[Lless than 2
percent of the seriously delinquent borrowers received a concessionary
modification in the year following their first serious delinquency . .. [whereas]
foreclosure proceedings were initiated on approximately half of the loans . . . .").
243. See id. at 1, 17 ("[Tlhere is a consensus among many observers that
concessionary modifications are the most, or possibly the only, effective way of
preventing foreclosures.").
244. Relatedly, others might argue that barring the reporting of mortgage
defaults would reduce the utility of the credit-reporting system in providing
information about the reliability of potential borrowers. This is true only if one
assumes that the same information about borrowers is relevant for secured
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the credit threat would increase borrowers' lending costs and
restrict credit. At the outset, it bears noting that this is the typical
argument against most consumer protections24 5 and that similar
arguments can be expected against any proposal that would
effectively shift some of the burden of underwater mortgages off
homeowners and onto lenders.246 Indeed, the same arguments about
increased interest rates and restricted credit have been made in
opposition to mortgage cramdowns1 7-though recent empirical work
by Adam Levitin and Joshua Goodman has suggested that
permitting bankruptcy modification of mortgages would have little
to no impact on mortgage markets.248 Predictions of high interest
rates and restricted credit should thus be approached with a healthy
bit of skepticism.
Moreover, any possible costs of eliminating the credit threat
versus unsecured debt. However, it would seem that secured debt, such as
home mortgages, should operate in a different sphere than unsecured debt,
when in fact the only collateral the lender has is the borrowers' credit score.
See Avery et al, supra note 118, at 625 (discussing the separate risk-assessment
model that already exists for home mortgages).
245. See Posner & Zingales, supra note 214, at 19 ("The financial industry
opposes any loan modification because it will increase the future cost of credit
and reduce its availability.").
246. See id.

247. See, e.g., Donald C. Lampe, Fred H. Miller & Alvin C. Harrell,
Introduction to the 2008 Annual Survey of ConsumerFinancialServices Law, 63

Bus. LAw. 561, 568 (2008) ("Solutions designed to prevent future problems by
reducing the availability of credit to marginal borrowers may (in addition to
affecting adversely those future borrowers) worsen the current plight of existing
marginal borrowers who need to refinance their homes. Direct relief for
troubled borrowers, e.g., a foreclosure moratorium or expanded bankruptcy
relief, may have the same effect. To some extent this has already happened.
The tightening of mortgage law requirements and regulatory restrictions over
the past few years in response to allegations of predatory lending have probably
contributed to the dramatic increase in foreclosures by making it more difficult
for troubled borrowers to refinance. A significant further tightening of these
restraints-we have heard this further tightening referred to as 'more robust
regulation'-may worsen the problem and increase the number of consumers
facing foreclosure as a result." (footnotes omitted)).
248. See Adam J. Levitin & Joshua Goodman, The Effect of Bankruptcy
Strip-Down on Mortgage Markets (Bus., Econ. & Regulatory Policy Working

Paper Series, Paper No. 1087816; Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 1087816, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1087816 (arguing that current and historical data
suggests that permitting bankruptcy modification of mortgages would have no
or little impact on mortgage markets, including mortgage interest rates); see
also Levitin, supra note 214, at 565 (arguing that "permitting modification
would have little or no impact on mortgage credit cost or availability"); Adam
Levitin, A Critique of the American Bankers Association's Study of Credit Card

Regulation (Bus., Econ. & Regulatory Policy Working Paper Series, Paper No.
1104327; Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 1104327,
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=1029191& (disputing contention by American Bankers Association that creditcard regulation increases interest rates).

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

1022

[Vol. 45

should be weighed against the potentially enormous benefit of
empowering homeowners to more successfully negotiate away their
negative equity. First, numerous studies have shown that negative
home equity reduces consumer spending: the higher the incidence of
negative equity in the housing market, the weaker aggregate
demand in the overall economy.249 Second, negative home equity is
associated with drastically reduced household mobility,5 o which has
a range of negative macroeconomic effects, including increased
structural unemployment, reduced productivity, and limited supply
251
capacity.
Empowering homeowners to reduce their negative
equity through renegotiation could thus have enormous economic
benefits in its own right.
Moreover, barring the reporting of mortgage defaults could have
positive effects on future lender behavior. This is because in the
case of a home mortgage, the lender has the ability to ensure that
the collateral is sufficient to create the proper economic incentives
for borrowers not to default. In other words, they need not rely on
credit scores to control their risk, but can instead ensure that the
249. See, e.g., DEUTSCHE BANK, supra note 10, at 16 (noting that negative
equity suppresses middle-class consumption); Andrew Benito et al., House
Prices and Consumer Spending, 46

Q.

BULL. 142 (2006) (Eng.) (showing that

negative equity in part negatively affects aggregate consumer spending);
Matthew Corder & Nyssa Roberts, UnderstandingDwellings Investment, 48

Q.

BULL. 393 (2008) (Eng.) (indicating that negative equity reduces the incentive
for homebuilders and homeowners to invest in housing); Tomas Hellebrandt,
Sandhya Kawar & Matt Waldron, The Economics and Estimation of Negative

Equity, 49 Q. BULL. 110, 111 (2009) (Eng.) ("A rising incidence of negative equity
is often associated with weak aggregate demand."); Andrew Benito & Haroon
Mumtaz,

Consumption Excess Sensitivity, Liquidity Constraints and the

CollateralRole of Housing (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 306, 2008) (noting
that negative equity raises the probability of a household being credit
constrained and thus unable to purchase); Richard Disney, Andrew Henley &
David Jevons, House Price Shocks, Negative Equity and Household
Consumption in the UK in the 1990s (Jan. 11, 2002) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://repec.org/res2002/Disney.pdf (finding that negative equity
leads to greater savings and lower spending).
250. See Hellebrandt, Kawar & Waldron, supra note 249, at 112 ("Negative
equity can affect household mobility by discouraging or restricting households
from moving house."); Andrew Henley, Residential Mobility, Housing Equity

and the Labour Market, 108 EcoN. J. 414, 426 (1998) (Eng.) (finding that twice
as many individuals would have moved in the early 1990s in England had they
not had negative equity); Fernando V. Ferreira, Joseph Gyourko & Joseph
Tracy, Housing Busts and Household Mobility (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,

Working Paper No. W14310, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org
/papers/wl4310.pdf (discussing the correlation between decreased household
mobility and negative equity); see also Louis Uchitelle, Unsold Homes Tie Down
Would-Be Transplants, N.Y. TImEs, Apr. 3, 2008, at Al ("The rapid decline in
housing prices is distorting the normal workings of the American labor market.
Mobility opens up job opportunities, allowing workers to go where they are most
needed.").
251. See Hellebrandt, Kawar & Waldron, supra note 249; Henley, supra note
250, at 422.
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purchase price of the financed home is in line with historically
sustainable price-to-rent ratios, demand sufficient down payment,
and eschew interest-only and negative-amortization loans.2 52
Lenders would be more inclined to take these sensible precautions if
borrowers were empowered to behave according to the same market
norms as lenders and breach when it is efficient to do so. This
added caution by lenders might in turn help to avoid a repeat of the
current housing crisis.
The above proposal should not, however, obscure the broader
point: norm asymmetry between borrowers and lenders creates
disincentives for lenders to renegotiate underwater mortgages and
makes it unlikely that lenders will work with borrowers to address
the negative equity issue. Any proposal to address the problems
created by negative equity must account for this reality, either by
addressing the resulting distributional inequities or by changing the
rules of the game. Viable approaches could include: (1) cutting
lenders out of the picture altogether through government financing
of mortgages at low interest rates; (2) using stimulus funds to buy
down the mortgages of underwater homeowners; 25 3 (3) forcing
lenders to reduce mortgage balances by court order; or (4) leveling
the playing field by eliminating the ability of lenders to trash a
borrower's credit score in retaliation for the borrower's exercise of
his contractual right to default.254
Regardless of the precise policy prescription, it is time to put to
rest the assumption that a borrower who exercises the option to
default is somehow immoral or irresponsible. To the contrary,
walking away may be the most financially responsible choice if it
allows one to meet one's unsecured credit obligations or provide for
the future economic stability of one's family. Individuals should not
be artificially discouraged on the basis of "morality" from making
financially prudent decisions, particularly when the party on the
other side is amorally operating according to market norms and
could have acted to protect itself by following prudent underwriting
practices. The current housing bust should be viewed for what it is:
a market failure and a failure to regulate, not a moral failure on the
part of American homeowners. That being the case, it is time to
take morals out of the picture and search for an equitable solution to
the negative equity problem.
252. Moreover, to the extent that a mortgage default is relevant to a credit
application, lenders could ask and borrowers could be required to disclose that
information-as borrowers are now required to do even when the default is no
longer reflected in their credit score.
253. See Cole, supra note 212 (proposing that "$300 billion in TARP or
stimulus funds" be "used to write down the principals on underwater
mortgages").
254. This limit on credit reporting should also, as discussed above, be
combined with a national antideficiency statute and an extension of the tax
waiver for forgiven mortgage debt.
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